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COMMERCIAL LAW
During the survey period,' New Mexico appellate courts handed down
several significant decisions in the area of commercial law. This article
surveys the state of commercial law in New Mexico by presenting a
detailed analysis of cases affecting contract law, guaranty, secured transactions, mortgages, and commercial enactments. The commercial enactments examined in this article include the Pawnbroker's Act, the New
Mexico Securities Act, the Liquor Control Act, the Unfair Trade Practices
Act, and the Motor Carrier Act.
CONTRACT LAW
contract
During the survey period, a wide spectrum of issues involving
2
issues
The
Court.
Supreme
law were generated by the New Mexico
difficult
more
the
to
theory
law
examined extend from basic contract
concepts of lien priority in contracts involving security interests.
I.

Unlicensed Contractors Subject to Penalties Provided Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and the New Mexico Construction
Industries Licensing Act
The purpose of the New Mexico Construction Industries Licensing Act
("Construction Act") is to provide a comprehensive method for the
licensing and control of contractors in order to protect the public from
either irresponsible or incompetent contractors "by adopting and enforcing
codes and standards for construction, alteration, installation, connection,
3
demolition, and repair work." The legislative intent of the Construction
Act contemplates harsh punishment for unlicensed contractors by denying
them access to the courts to collect compensation for the work they
performed. 4 This legislative policy overrides the judicial principle that
disfavors unjust enrichment.'
The Construction Act is governed by the Construction Industries Commission, which is composed of New Mexico citizens who are closely

A.

I. This survey covers cases printed in the New Mexico Bar Bulletin between August 1, 1990
and July 31, 1991.
2. All contract cases are appealed directly to the supreme court. See N.M. R. App. P. 12-102.
in
This rule states that the supreme court has jurisdiction over "appeals from the district courts
which one or more counts of the complaint alleges a breach of contract or otherwise sounds in
contract."
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-1.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1989); see In re Romero, 535 F.2d 618, 621
(10th Cir. 1976).
4. Triple B Corp. v. Brown & Root, Inc., 106 N.M. 99, 101, 739 P.2d 968, 971 (1987). See
generally Daughtrey v. Carpenter, 82 N.M. 173, 477 P.2d 807 (1970) (legislature intended to prohibit
suits by unlicensed contractors acting illegally, and not to preclude lawful contractors from recovering
damages because of a technical error in their pleadings).
5. Triple B Corp., 106 N.M. 99, 100, 739 P.2d 968, 970 (1987); see, e.g., Campbell v. Smith,
68 N.M. 373, 362 P.2d 523 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Sundance Mechanical & Util. Corp.
have
v. Atlas, 109 N.M. 683, 789 P.2d 1250 (1990) (one who has shown himself to be required to
contractor's license cannot recover under quantum meruit in absence of such license).
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affiliated with the construction industry.6 All contractors must be licensed
by the Construction Industries Commission 7 and must pass special examinations.' A contractor cannot bring suit in any New Mexico court
for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act without
proving that the contractor was licensed at the time of the cause of
9

action. Additionally, any contractor operating without a license cannot
file a mechanic's lien.' 0 Under the Construction Act, an employee who
is paid by the hour does not constitute a contractor." Courts are reluctant
to construe the Construction Act more broadly than necessary for the
2
achievement of its purpose.'
Mascarenas v. Jaramillo3 involved a suit by a trailer park owner against

an unlicensed contractor for breach of contract. In November, 1985,
Mascarenas, the trailer park owner, entered into an oral contract with
Jaramillo, an unlicensed contractor. '4 "The contract required Jaramillo
to construct sewer and water lines and to perform grading, leveling,

excavation and backfilling" for a price of $4,916.53.1 Mascarenas knew
that Jaramillo was not a licensed contractor. 6 Over the course of the
next six months, Mascarenas paid $4,898 of the contract price before the

construction was completed.' 7 In June, 1987, Jaramillo's construction work
failed the required government inspection. 8 Mascarenas then hired four

6. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-6(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989) for a list of the members of the
commission.
7. The statute states: "No person shall act as a contractor without a license issued by the
division classified to cover the type of work to be undertaken." Id. § 60-13-12(A). See generally
Peck v. Ives, 84 N.M. 62, 499 P.2d 684 (1972) (no person shall engage in business of a contractor
unless the construction industries commission (division) has issued him a license which covers the
type of work to be undertaken).
8. The statute states in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no certificate of qualification shall be
issued to any individual desiring to be a qualifying party until he has passed with
a satisfactory score an examination approved and adopted by the division.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-16(A). The section further states:
The examination shall consist of a test based on general business knowledge, rules
and regulations of the division and the provisions of the Construction Industries
Licensing Act [this article]. In addition, applicants for a GB, MM or EE classification
or for any other classification which the Commission determines to be appropriate
shall take a test based on technical knowledge and familiarity with the prescribed
codes and minimum standards of the particular classification for which certification
is requested. The division shall provide examinations in both English and Spanish.
Id. § 60-13-16(B).
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-30 (Repl. Pamp. 1989). See generally Fleming v. Phelps-Dodge
Corp., 83 N.M. 715, 496 P.2d 1111 (Ct. App. 1972) (plaintiff's action to recover damages for
breach of contract may not be maintained where the plaintiff must rely on an alleged contract
created in violation of statutes which prohibit contracting as unlicensed contractor).
10. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-30(B).
I1. "Contractor" does not include an individual who works only for wages. Id. § 60-13-3(D)(10).
12. See generally Olivas v. Sibco, Inc., 87 N.M. 488, 535 P.2d 1339 (1975).
13. 111 N.M. 410, 806 P.2d 59 (1991).
14. Id. at 411, 806 P.2d at 60.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 411-12, 806 P.2d at 60-61.
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separate contractors to correct Jaramillo's work.' 9 The total cost of correcting the work was $7,124.93.0
Mascarenas brought suit against Jaramillo claiming breach of contract,
breach of implied warranty, and negligence. 2' Jaramillo counterclaimed,

seeking recovery of the balance of the oral contract price and for defamation. 22 During a non-jury trial, the district court judge found that
Jaramillo was not an employee of Mascarenas and entered judgment in
favor of Mascarenas on all counts, awarding her $7,124.93 for the cor23
rective work, $2,000 compensatory damages, and $250 for costs. Jaramillo
appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by finding that he was not
an employee of Mascarenas, that he breached an implied warranty, that

an unlicensed contractor must refund payments already received, and that

paying the costs of correcting his work constituted double recovery.2
Mascarenas cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing
Jaramillo
to award her prejudgment interest on a loan she received to pay
6
25 lost rental income, and all associated costs.
work,
his
for
The New Mexico Supreme Court stated that "the principal test to

determine whether one is an independent contractor or an employee is
whether the employer has any control over the manner in which the
' ' 27 The court acknowledged
details of the work are to be accomplished.

the sufficiency of the trial court evidence which showed that Jaramillo

never received an hourly wage, never submitted time slips, or submitted

tax forms.2 The court concluded that Jaramillo met the definition of a
contractor under the Construction Act. 29

19. Id. at 412, 806 P.2d at 61.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Jaramillo did not challenge the trial court's finding of negligence. Id. at 413, 806 P.2d
at 62.
25. Id. at 413, 806 P.2d at 62. Mascarenas obtained a loan to finance construction of the trailer
park. Id. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63.
26. Id. at 413, 806 P.2d at 62.
27. Id. at 412, 806 P.2d at 61 (quoting Campbell v. Smith, 68 N.M. 373, 377, 362 P.2d 523,
526 (1961)).
28. Id.
29. Id. The Construction Act states:
"contractor":
As used in the Construction Industries Licensing Act ...
A. means any person who undertakes, offers to undertake by bid or other means
or purports to have the capacity to undertake, by himself or through others,
contracting. Contracting includes but is not limited to constructing, altering, repairing, installing or demolishing any:
(7) sewerage, water, gas or other pipeline;
(10) water, oil or other storage tank;
(13) excavating earth;
(14) air conditioning, conduit, heating or other similar mechanical works;
(15) electrical wiring, plumbing or plumbing fixture, consumers' gas piping, gas
appliances or water conditioners; or
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The court next examined whether an implied warranty existed due to
the oral contract,30 Jaramillo argued that because the contract work constituted a service rather than a good, the Uniform Commercial Code
("N.M.U.C.C.") did not apply, and thus, Mascarenas would have no
remedy under the N.M.U.C.C. for an implied breach of warranty.3 The
court, however, noted the long standing legal proposition that a "breach
of implied warranty by a tradesman to perform in a skilled and workmanlike fashion is a common-law theory of recovery in New Mexico." 32
The court further noted that the oral contract did not contain any language
defining limitations or exclusions of any warranties. 33 The court concluded
that substantial evidence existed to support an affirmation of the trial
court's finding of breach of implied warranty. 34
As to double recovery, the court decided an issue of first impression
in New Mexico-whether the recipient of construction work can recover
payments made on a contract to an unlicensed contractor. 3 The court
stated that the Construction Act bars an unlicensed contractor from
bringing or maintaining a suit on the contract or in quantum meruit 3 6
The court further noted that prior decisions by the supreme court affirm
the legislature's intent to protect the general public in enacting the Con37
struction Act.
Additionally, the court, relying on a California Supreme Court decision, 38
found "that allowing recovery of payments made on a contract to an
unlicensed construction contractor serves and advances the purpose of the
[Construction] Act." 3 9 The court noted, however, that one potential problem with the Construction Act is that it allows an unlicensed contractor
to collect compensation for most or all of the contract price before
significant commencement or performance of the contract.4 The supreme
court stopped this practice, deciding that,"[a]s a matter of public policy,
an unlicensed contractor may not retain payments made pursuant to a
contract which requires him to perform in violation of the Construction
Industries Licensing Act. " 4' The court found that this rule is applicable

(16) similar work, structures or installations which are covered by applicable codes
adopted under the provisions of the Construction Industries Licensing Act[.]
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
30. Id. at 412, 806 P.2d at 61.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 413, 816 P.2d at 62; cf. Peck v. Ives, 84 N.M. 62, 499 P.2d 684 (1972). Where
appellant has violated provisions of the Construction Act as to aggregate dollar amount of contract
for which he is financially responsible at any one time, and thus, no longer a licensed contractor,
"he has . . . 'substantially complied' with the licensing requirements to such a degree that he is
not barred from bringing suit". Peck, 84 N.M. at 65, 499 P.2d at 687.
36. Mascarenas, Ill N.M. at 413, 806 P.2d at 62 (citations omitted).
37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Domach v. Spencer, 101 Cal. App. 3d 308, 161 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1980).
39. Mascarenas, Ill N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63.
40. Id.
41.

Id.
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despite the fact that the recipient of the construction work has knowledge
42
of the non-licensure of the contractor. In so deciding, the court reversed
the trial court with respect to the award of a partial refund, and instead,
"remanded with instructions to award Mascarenas a full refund of

$4,898.00.'

4

1

Examining Mascarenas' claims regarding damages, the supreme court
held that "damage awards should fully compensate the injured party,
''
whether the action is . .. in contract or in tort." Because "Jaramillo's
' ' 45
breach precluded Mascarenas from discharging the construction loan,
is justly
the court found that a party "who fails to perform his contractbreach."
46
the
from
naturally
flowing
responsible for all of the damages
ruling and awarded Mascarenas preThe court reversed the trial court's
47
loan.
the
judgment interest on
In examining Mascarenas' claim regarding lost rental income, the supreme court found that the trial court did not apply the correct standard
when it found that "[lhost rental income claimed by [Mascarenas] is too
speculative and thus was not established by clear and convincing evidence." ' Despite this, the court found that in view of the whole record,
the trial court was not convinced by the speculative nature of Mascarenas'
claim.4 9 Thus, the court held that "[d]amages based on surmise, conjecture,
or speculation cannot be sustained ... [and] must be proven with reasonable certainty.'""
The court also held that Mascarenas was entitled to recover her costs.',
be
This award, the court noted, is completely discretionary and cannot
2 Finding
.
discretion
of
reversed unless the action constituted an abuse
that no abuse of discretion was present, the supreme court upheld the
53
trial court's award of $250 to Mascarenas.
This decision reflects the supreme court's willingness to bar contractor's
non-licensure practices in New Mexico. This is true despite the fact that
the construction project customer has knowledge of the contractor's nonlicensure.Y Before this decision unlicensed contractors could retain partial
or total payment of the construction project if the unlicensed contractor

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Shaeffer v. Kelton, 95 N.M. 182, 187, 619 P.2d 1226, 1231 (1980)).

45. Id.

46. Id. (quoting Shaeffer v. Kelton, 95 N.M. 182, 187, 619 P.2d 1226, 1231 (1980)).
47. Id. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63.
48. Id.at 415, 806 P.2d at 64.

49. Id.

50. Id. The supreme court did not divulge whether it believed the evidence proved or disproved
Mascarenas' claim of lost rental income. Id. Because the court did not remand with further instructions
on this issue, it must be presumed that Mascarenas did not meet her burden of proof at trial.
51. ld. (relying on N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054 (1984)). This rule relates to final judgments (N.M.
R. Civ. P. 1-054(A)), and the award of costs during a trial (N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-054(E)). Mascarenas
alleged error on the part of the trial court for failing to award her the full $545.00 requested in
her cost bill. Mascarenas, 111 N.M. at 415, 806 P.2d at 64.
52. Mascarenas, Ill N.M. at 415, 806 P.2d at 64 (citations omitted).

53. Id.
54. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-13-30(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
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"collect[ed] most or all of the contract price before significant commencement of performance."" This was true even if the project did not
meet the customer's perception of quality construction work. After this
decision, however, this is no longer true.56 Unlicensed contractors will be
severely punished: unlicensed contractors may be ordered to disgorge not

only the contract price already received, but also pay additional costs of

correction of any construction work and damages.5 7 New Mexico courts
will strictly interpret the Construction Act against an unlicensed contractor.
Therefore, in New Mexico, the rule is "unlicensed contractor beware."
B.

Third Party Beneficiary Contracts

A general rule of contracts is that "one who is not a party to a contract
[or agreement] cannot maintain a suit upon it."8 A third party, however,
can attain the status of beneficiary of such contract or agreement. 59 As
a beneficiary the third party may, have enforceable rights against those
parties in the contract.60 Such third-parties are called "third-party beneficiaries" and are created by the intent of the contracting parties. 6' The
dispositive question is whether the contracting parties intended the contract
to benefit the third party. 62 The intent can be inferred from the contract

itself or from the actions of any one of the contracting parties. 63 Further,
an executory contract to settle a claim operates as a defense to the claim
even though the contract has not yet been performed.

4

C. Contractual Waiver Distinguishedfrom Contractual Modification
and ContractualEstoppel by Waiver
New Mexico courts have defined contractual waiver as "the intentional

relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.

' 65

This definition

55. Mascarenas, Ill N.M. at 414, 806 P.2d at 63.

56. Id. The court found that the Construction Act barred compensation for an unlicensed
contractor "no matter how expertly performed." Id.
57. Because Jaramillo decided to appeal the trial court's awards to Mascarenas, he paid the
price. At trial, he was ordered to pay Mascarenas a total of $9,374.93. After the supreme court
decision, he had to pay Mascarenas $12,272.93 (a difference of $2,898). Id.
58. See generally Staley v. New, 56 N.M. 756, 250 P.2d 893 (1952).
59. Permian Basin Inv. Corp. v. Lloyd, 63 N.M. 1, 6, 312 P.2d 533, 538 (1957) (holders of
first right to purchase prospecting permit sought to recover from promisor for its refusal to perform
its contract with promisee for purchase of prospecting permit. The New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the evidence sustained trial court's finding that promisor had no knowledge of first refusal
rights and that holders thereof were incidental beneficiaries under contract between promisor and
promisee.).
60. Id.

61. McKinney v. Davis, 84 N.M. 352, 353, 503 P.2d 332, 333 (1972) (a prime requisite to the
status of "third party beneficiary" under a contract "is that the parties to the contract must have
intended to benefit the third party, who must be something more than a mere incidental beneficiary").
62. Valdez v. Cillessen & Son, Inc., 105 N.M. 575, 581, 734 P.2d 1258, 1264 (1987) (intent of
parties to a contract to benefit third party "must appear either from the contract itself or from
some evidence that the person claiming to be a third-party beneficiary is an intended beneficiary.").
63. Id.

64. Western Bank v. Biava, 109 N.M. 550, 551, 787 P.2d 830, 831 (1990) (citing Clark Leasing
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 (1975)).
65. J.R. Hale Contracting Co., Inc. v. United New Mexico Bank, 110 N.M. 712, 714, 799 P.2d
581, 585 (1990) (citing Young v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 101 N.M. 545, 547, 685 P.2d 953,
955 (1984)).
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recognizes that the intent to waive contractual obligations or conditions
or conduct, despite
may be implied-in-fact from a party's representations
66 Nevertheless, these
waiver.
of
the absence of an express declaration
"implied in fact" waivers must be a "voluntary act whose effect is
or implied based
intended.' '6 A waiver, however, might be presumed
68
party.
non-waiving
upon the honest belief of the
69
In J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. United New Mexico Bank, the New
Mexico Supreme Court examined the basic principles underlying the theory
of waiver under contract law. J.R. Hale Contracting ("Hale") entered
into numerous loan transactions with United New Mexico Bank at Al70 Although the notes specified due
buquerque ("United New Mexico").
7
dates, Hale was frequently late in making its payments on the notes. '
United New Mexico took no formal action as to the late payments by
Hale. 2 Instead, it chose to contact Hale and request that the payment
be made or take the payment from one of Hale's accounts and send a
notice of advice to Hale."
In November, 1982, Hale executed a renewal note in favor of United
4
New Mexico in the amount of $400,000.7 Toward the end of February
another loan, as the
1983, Hale approached United New Mexico for
75
and United New
Hale
drawn.
fully
was
credit
of
line
$400,000
existing
the first three
during
loan
new
a
of
possibility
the
negotiated
Mexico
weeks of March. 76 United New Mexico, however, was concerned about
the existing $400,000 note and the late payment that was due on March
1.77 In the negotiations between the parties, however, the matter of the
78
overdue interest payment was never discussed. On March 24, United
79
in full immediately.
payable
and
due
New Mexico called the $400,000 note
66. Elephant Butte Resort Marina, Inc. v. Wooldridge, 102 N.M. 286, 290, 694 P.2d 1351, 1355
(1985).
67. J.R. Hale Contracting Co. v. United New Mexico Bank, 110 N.M. 712, 717, 799 P.2d 581,
588 (1990).
68. Ed Black's Chevrolet Center, Inc. v. Melichar, 81 N.M. 602, 604, 471 P.2d 172, 174 (1970).
69. 110 N.M. 712, 799 P.2d 581 (1990).
70. Id. at 714, 799 P.2d at 583. Each of these transactions involved revolving lines of credit
in increasing amounts. Id.
71. Id. at 714-15, 799 P.2d at 583-84.
72. Id. at 715, 799 P.2d'at 584.
73. Id.
74. Id. The note provided in pertinent part:
If ANY installment of principal and/or interest on this note is not paid when due
... or if [United Bank) in good faith deems itself insecure or believes that the

prospect of receiving payment required by this note is impaired; thereupon, at the
option of [United Bank], this note and any and all other indebtedness of [Hale]
shall become and be due and payable forthwith without demand, notice of nonpayment, presentment, protest or notice of dishonor, all of which are hereby expressly
waived by [Hale] ....

Id.
75.
76.
during
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. These negotiations comprised a series of meetings between Hale and United New Mexico
this period. Id.
Id.
Id. at 719, 799 P.2d at 588.
Id. at 715, 799 P.2d at 584.
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Although Hale offered to immediately pay the accrued interest charges
on the note, the bank refused to reconsider its decision to make the note
payable in full immediately.80 United New Mexico then proceeded to collect
in full all amounts due on the note. 8' Hale brought suit against United
New Mexico claiming wrongful acceleration of the note.8 2
At trial, Hale argued three points based on questions of fact.8 3 First,
Hale argued that an issue existed on whether the bank waived the late
interest penalty clause in the note.84 Second, Hale argued that an issue
remained regarding whether the bank impliedly modified the note due to
its previous inaction to accelerate other late payment notes.8" Finally, Hale
argued that an issue existed as to whither the bank was estopped to
assert the late interest penalty clause ii'the note. 6 United New Mexico
argued that Hale failed to produce any evidence showing that United
New Mexico had waived the default clause, modified the terms of the
note, or was estopped from declaring a default. 87 United New Mexico
also argued that it relied on the insecurity clause in the note which required
Hale to make a prima facie showing that the bank lacked good faith in
accelerating payment under that clause.88 United New Mexico also moved
for a directed verdict, alleging that Hale failed to introduce sufficient
evidence showing that the bank lacked a good faith belief that the $400,000
loan was in jeopardy.8 9 United New Mexico moved for a directed verdict
on the grounds that there was no waiver of the note's late interest penalty
clause, there was no modification to the original note, and thus, the bank
was not estopped from accelerating the note. 90
The district court judge granted United New Mexico's motion for
directed verdict as to the question of waiver, modification, and estoppel,
finding that the note's acceleration was justified due to the note's twentythree day delinquency period on the note's interest. 9' The district court
judge* reasoned that "although a jury issue existed regarding the bank's
acceleration under the insecurity clause, none existed regarding the bank's
right to accelerate payments" under the default clause in the note. 92 The
court, however, denied United New Mexico's alternative motion for a
directed verdict based on lack of evidence regarding United New Mexico's
good faith efforts, holding that "facts [existed] in the record from which

80. Id.
81. Id. The interest accrual amounted to $418,801.86. Id.
82. Id. at 714, 799 P.2d at 583.
83. Id. at 716, 799 P.2d at 585. The three arguments are based on that same proposition-the
bank's conduct negated the express default provision in the note. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 715-16, 799 P.2d at 584-85.
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a jury could conclude that the bank lacked good faith." 93 Hale appealed
the entry of a directed verdict in favor of United New Mexico to the
New Mexico Supreme Court.9
Hale argued that United New Mexico's conduct expressly abrogated the
acceleration clause in the note. 95 Hale argued that based upon the party's
prior course of dealing, the bank's acceptance of late payments on past
due notes signified the bank's waiver of the clause which allowed the
96
bank to call a note due and payable immediately without prior notice.
The court disagreed, finding that the bank's acceptance of late payments97
in prior transactions involved completely separate contractual obligations.

Because the bank never accepted a late payment on the $400,000 note,
the court found that the bank never waived the contractual provision

regarding late payment penalties. 9 For such a waiver to exist, the court

held, an actual intent to waive the payment or waive the contractual right

to call a note due without prior notice must be "implied from all parties

[sic] conduct in the performance of that obligation."

99

Otherwise, the

court reasoned, any express terms in the contract when executed would
be meaningless.' ° Although the parties' prior agreements allowed late

payments, the court found that both parties' intent to strictly comply
with the provisions in the $400,000 loan contract did not allow such late

payments.' 0 Thus, the court upheld the legal proposition that in a conflict
between prior conduct regarding contractual obligations and an express
agreement, the express agreement will sustain the parties' contractual
obligations to one another. 0 2
Because the rest of Hale's argument relied on the combination of
waiver, modification, and estoppel, the supreme court next attempted
to clarify these principles. 03 Upon a comparison of relevant secondary
4
authority, particularly Corbin on Contracts,10 and prior New Mexico

93. Id. at 720, 799 P.2d at 589.
94. Id. at 714, 799 P.2d at 583.
95. Id. at 716, 799 P.2d at 585.
96. Id. at 717, 799 P.2d at 586 (citing Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d
726 (1967)). In Thomas, a single finance agreement existed requiring written authorization to sell
cattle. A creditor, however, continuously allowed a debtor to sell cattle without the required written
authorization. The supreme court found that the creditor had consented to the sale, if not expressly,
then impliedly, under the provisions set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code. Such consent to
the sale of cattle, the court held, constituted a waiver of the creditor's security interest. Thomas,
77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726.
97. J.R. Hale, 110 N.M. at 718, 799 P.2d at 587.
98. Id. The court distinguished Thomas by finding that the finance agreement in Thomas involved
a single contract. In this case, the court found that the multiple note agreements entered into by
Hale and United constituted separate and completely unique obligations. Id.
99. Id. (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. The court stated, however, "[W]hether their conduct after the execution of the agreement
indicates an intention to waive a particular provision is another question." Id.
102. Id. The supreme court found that this determination comports with the New Mexico Uniform
Commercial Code. Id.
103. Id. at 717, 799 P.2d at 586.
104. See 3A A.L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1960).
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cases, 10 5 the supreme court found several distinct features among these
principles. 106
1. Waiver
The court found that Professor Corbin did not clarify the meaning
of waiver "without knowing the facts the term is being used to describe,"
but did state that "waiver depends upon what one himself intends to
do."'07 The court found that in New Mexico waiver is generally viewed
as the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."' 10 8
The intent to waive, the court held, could be implied from a party's
representations, even if such representations are not express. 1' 9
2. Waiver by Estoppel
The court found that Professor Corbin viewed waiver by estoppel as
"expressions or conduct that lead a party reasonably to believe that
certain conditions or obligations will not be insisted upon [... and that]
courts will then speak in terms of estoppel as well as waiver.""10 The
court further found that Professor Corbin described estoppel as "depend[ing] only upon what one's conduct has caused another party to
do.""' In examining prior New Mexico decisions, the court found that
implied representations could be labeled as "waiver by estoppel." The
court stated:
To prove waiver by estoppel the party need only show that he was
misled to his prejudice by the conduct of the other party into the
honest and reasonable belief that such waiver was intended. The
estoppel is justified because the estopped party reasonably could expect
that his actions would induce the reliance of the other party. However,
unlike the case of a voluntary waiver, either express or implied in
fact, the waiver of the contractual obligation or condition and the
effect of the conduct upon the opposite party may have been unintentional. "'2
3.

Waiver, Modification, and Waiver by Estoppel Distinguished
and Applied
The court held that based upon its examination of the relevant case
law and secondary authorities, three forms of waiver could be produced:

105. See generally Elephant Butte Resort Marina, Inc. v. Wooldridge,
P.2d 1351, 1354 (1985); see also Cooper v. Albuquerque City Comm'n,
P.2d 275, 279 (1974).
106. J.R. Hale, 110 N.M. at 717, 799 P.2d at 586.
107. Id. at 716, 799 P.2d at 585 (citing 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note
108. Id.
109. Id. at 716-17, 799 P.2d at 585-86 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 716, 799 P.2d at 585 (citing 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note
III. Id. (citing 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note 104, § 752).
112. id. at 717, 799 P.2d at 586 (footnote omitted).

102 N.M. 286, 289, 694
85 N.M. 786, 790, 518
104, § 752).
104, § 754).
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(1) actual waiver, either express or implied in fact, not supported by
consideration, which may be retracted in the absence of detrimental
reliance;
(2) modification, which is not subject to retraction, based upon mutual
agreement to waive certain obligations or conditions and the exchange
of consideration; or
(3) waiver by estoppel based upon either an actual waiver or certain.
"expressions or conduct" where the reliance of the opposite party
justifies the inhibition to assert the oband his change of position
3
condition."
or
ligation
Applying the principles of "actual waiver," the court found that any
intent of the bank to waive its contractual rights must have occurred
after execution of the contract." 4 The court, however, did not find any
evidence to prove the bank intended, either expressly or impliedly, an
actual waiver." 5 The court held that once a party accepts a late payment
without objection, that party waives any contractual rights that may have
existed in an express contract." 6 If such action continues, the court noted,
this may generally suggest an intention to accept late payments."' Although
the bank's actions during the negotiations may have been construed as
misleading, the court found that its conduct did not present a factual
issue as to whether it intended to waive its contractual rights."' Rather,
the court found that the bank simply intended to ignore the delinquent
payment.' '9
Applying the principles of "modification," the court found that no
factual question existed to prove the bank intended to waive its right to
°
call the note due and payable immediately.1' Because no issue existed
as to the bank's intent, the court found that the parties could never
have intended to generate a new contract in lieu of the previous contract,
nor could the parties amend the $400,000 contract to include new late
payment penalty provisions.' 2' Even if the bank's intent could show that
existed, the court found it was not supported
such an amended agreement
22
consideration.
by
Applying the principles of "waiver by estoppel," the court found that
a question of fact existed in the course of negotiations between the two
parties. 23 The New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code recognizes that
"one party to a contract [can] use his past commercial dealing with
another party as a basis for the interpretation of the other party's

113. Id.
114. Id. at 719, 799 P.2d at 588.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. The court concluded by stating: "An issue of contract modification should be approached
in these terms." Id.
123. Id.
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conduct."' The court found that due to prior transactions between the
parties, Hale could reasonably interpret the bank's conduct as allowing
a late payment and that the bank should have been aware of this
situation. 2 The court concluded that the United New Mexico's acceleration of the note without prior notice to Hale could be considered as
having a detrimental effect on Hale.'2
4. Good Faith Acceleration
Viewing United New Mexico's claim that Hale failed to make a prima
facie showing that the bank lacked good faith in accelerating the note,
the court noted that such a claim presented an issue of fact under the
insecurity clause.' 27 Under the N.M.U.C.C., 28 good faith is defined as
"honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.' ' 29 The court
noted that there are two standards of good faith applied by courts under
the model Uniform Commercial Code-one which subjectively proposes
that a creditor genuinely believe the prospect for repayment is impaired
(no reasonable belief is required), 30 and the other which objectively asks
"whether the creditor was reasonable under the circumstances in believing
that the prospect for repayment was impaired."'' The court held that
the N.M.U.C.C. "does not impose an objective standard of commercial
reasonableness on . . . the bank . . . when the bank . . . [believes] ...
its prospect for repayment is impaired."'13 2 Instead, the court held that
the U.C.C. imposes a "standard of honesty in fact," which is the
minimum standard which can be altered by the parties to the contract. 3
This subjective standard, the court held, "should be based on the facts
and circumstances surrounding the acceleration and not solely on the
bank's testimony [regarding] its own state of mind.' '1 34 Under this standard, the supreme court established that a trier of fact could find a
creditor acted without a good faith belief that its prospect for repayment
was impaired when:

124. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-205(l) (1978)).
125. Id. The court examined evidence that Hale instructed the bank to notify him during the
negotiations of the past due payment, but the bank failed to notify him at the next meeting.
Evidence also existed which showed that the bank gave Hale a letter of reference regarding past
business dealings. The letter stated: "All experience with J.R. Hale Contracting Company has been
satisfactory." Id. at 720, 799 P.2d at 589.
126. Id. at 720, 799 P.2d at 589.
127. Id.
128. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1-201 to -2A-532 (Repl. Pamp. 1989).
129. J.R. Hale, 110 N.M. at 720, 799 P.2d at 589 (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-201(19)).
A party may accelerate payment or performance if, in good faith, he holds a good faith belief
that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.
130. Id. at 721, 799 P.2d at 590. The court stated that the subjective standard has been criticized
because: "[a] declaration of insecurity is a unilateral decision made by the creditor which places a
severe hardship upon the debtor. This hardship is unjust if the creditor's decision is unreasonable
or based upon mistaken facts which the creditor may honestly believe to be true." Id. (quoting
Richards Engrs., Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 722. 799 P.2d at 591.

133. Id.
134. Id.
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(1) under the facts and circumstances that were known to
creditor, there existed a reasonable inference that the creditor in
did not conclude that its prospect for repayment was impaired
that acceleration was necessary to protect its interests, or
(2) there existed a reasonable inference that the creditor chose
to undertake such investigation as:
(a) was necessary to make an informed decision and
(b) would have shown that the foreseeable risk of nonpayment
not materially greater than when the loan was made. 3 '

the
fact
and
not
was

Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the district court's determination
that Hale established sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case
l6
against the bank due to lack of good faith, requiring a jury finding.
This decision represents one of the most important cases to be decided
during the survey period. In short, this decision clarifies the distinguishing
features and requirements of contract waiver, modification, and estoppel
that have been a source of confusion in prior New Mexico cases. J.R.
Hale further demonstrates that in a conflict between prior contract conduct
between the parties and a newly-formed express contract, the provisions
set forth in the express contract governs. Finally, this decision is significant
as it defines a standard two-step test for good faith analysis under the
New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON A DEMAND
GUARANTY STARTS WHEN DEMAND IS MADE
UPON THE GUARANTOR
7
In Western Bank of Albuquerque v. Franklin Development Corp.,
the New Mexico Supreme Court determined when the statute of limitations
begins to run on a demand guaranty. 3 In March of 1977, Citizens Bank
("Citizens") approved a loan to Franklin Development Corporation
("Franklin") for $52,000.1 9 In addition to the corporate note, Franklin's
president, Max Pollack, signed a continuing personal guaranty of the
loan.140 Four years later Citizens loaned Franklin an additional $25,000. 4l
In December of 1984, Citizens merged with Western Bank ("Western"),
whereby Western succeeded Citizens' assets and liabilities (including all
indebtedness and continuing guaranties).' 42 In the same year the outstanding principles of the Franklin loans were consolidated into a single
loan. 43 In 1987 and 1988, Franklin's loan was renewed and extended.i "
II.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 722-23, 799 P.2d at 591-92. The court found evidence which showed that the bank
had sufficient collateral to cover the interest payments. This evidence, the court said, was enough
to qualify as a question of fact under the definition of good faith requirements. Id.
137. 111 N.M. 259, 804 P.2d 1078 (1991).
138. Id. at 260, 804 P.2d at 1079.
139. Id.

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. The total outstanding balance was $39,609.07. Id.

144. Id.
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Although Franklin continuously made late loan payments to Western
after October 1984, Western never contacted Pollack about the problems
or about his liability on his guaranty until the summer of 1987.41 In
February of 1988, Western informed Franklin it was in default of its
payments as of October 25, 1987.146 Two weeks later Western wrote
Franklin demanding that the note be brought current.' 47 In April 1988,
4
Western called the note due in full, notifying Franklin and Pollack.'
In the notice Western demanded full payment of the unpaid portion of
the consolidated loan. 49
Western brought suit against Franklin to collect all amounts due on
the unpaid loan and to invoke Pollack's guaranty.' 50 The Bernalillo County
District Court found in favor of Western in the amount of $32,262.42
and also awarded interest, attorney's fees and costs."' Pollack appealed.'52
Pollack argued that the statute of limitations for written contracts barred
the Bank's claim against the corporation.'" Pollack further argued that
"because the Guaranty was payable 'on demand ... whether due or
not due,' it should be construed as a demand 'instrument' and therefore,
54
the limitations period should run from the day it is signed.""2
The New Mexico Supreme Court first analyzed the event that triggers
the limitation period on general guaranty contracts.' The general rule
is that "the statute of limitations begins to run upon a contract of
guaranty the moment a right of action upon the contract accrued, not
before."'5 6 The court recognized that "a demand for performance is an
express condition precedent to the duty of immediate performance."' 5 7
In adopting the general rule, the court noted other jurisdictions' approval.'"" Therefore, the court reasoned, "the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until demand is actually made."' 5 9 Once the demand
is made, the court held, a duty is created to pay the debt in full. 16
An "exception to this rule applies to demand notes or negotiable
instruments payable on demand.''6 This exception states that the start

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. Franklin and the other codefendants did not participate in the appeal.
153. Id. The relevant statute defining the statute of limitation period is "those founded upon
any bond, promissory note, bill of exchange or other contract in writing, or upon any judgment
of any court not of record, within six years." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-3(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
154. Western Bank, II1 N.M. at 261, 804 P.2d at 1080.
155. Id. at 260, 804 P.2d at 1079.
156. Id. (quoting Cullender v. Levers, 38 N.M. 436, 440, 34 P.2d 1089, 1091 (1934)).
157. Id. at 261, 804 P.2d at 1080 (quoting 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note 104, § 643).
158. Id. at 260-61, 804 P.2d at 1079-80 (citing Production Credit Ass'n of Midlands v. Schmer,
233 Neb. 749, 448 N.W.2d 123 (1989); California First Bank v. Braden, 216 Cal. App. 3d 672,
264 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1989)).
159. Id. at 261, 804 P.2d at 1080 (citing 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note 104, § 643).

160. Id.
161. Id. (citing 3A A.L. CORBIN, supra note 104, § 643).
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"of the statute of limitations commences upon the execution or delivery
of the note" or negotiable instrumerit. 62 The court stated that the exa debt is due and payable when the term
ception provides notice 6 that
"on demand" is used. 3 In affirming the trial court's judgment for
Western, the court held that the statute of limitations on a demand
guaranty begins to run when demand is made upon the guarantor.
III. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
During the survey year, the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered
secured transactions as they relate to the pawnbroker business. The typical
loan transaction between a pawnbroker and a pawnor results in a security
agreement.' 64 The security agreement creates a security interest for the
pawnbroker in the pawned property or collateral. 6 5 This security interest
"secures" the loan by providing the pawnbroker a remedy for satisfying
the debt if the pawnor defaults on the loan.'16 The Pawnbrokers Act
requires the pawnbroker to comply with the New Mexico Uniform Commercial Code when it disposes of the collateral to satisfy the debt.' 67
Among other requirements, the pawnbroker must notify the pawnor of
its intent to retain or sell the collateral in satisfaction of the debt.' The
mechanics of this notification determine whether the pawnbroker is subject
to gross receipts tax on the sale of the pawned property.1' During the
survey period, the New Mexico Court of Appeals established how a
pawnbroker's failure to accord proper sale notification to the pawnor
will subject the sale to gross receipts tax.
In Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation & Revenue Department,'"° the court
of appeals dealt with an issue of first impression: whether a pawnbroker's
receipts from the sale of pawned property represents funds which are
exempt from gross receipts taxes as the return of principal and costs
associated with the loan transaction.' 7' A summary of a pawnbroker's
remedies on a defaulted loan is necessary before addressing the issue
above.

162. Id. (citing 3A A.L. CoRwN, supra note 104, § 643).
163. Id. The Court said, however, that the exception does not apply when the term "on demand"
is applied to one who is to pay the debt of the original debtor. "Because no cause of action for
breach arises until demand is made upon the guarantor, the statute of limitations does not commence
until demand has been made." Id.
164. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-105 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
165. d. § 55-1-201(37) (Cum. Supp. 1992) (defining "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation").
166. d. § 55-9-504 (allowing the creditor to sell the collateral to satisfy the debt); Id. § 55-9505(2) (allowing the creditor to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt).
167. d. § 56-12-11(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1986). For a discussion of the Pawnbrokers Act see infira
text accompanying notes 268-300.
168. Id. §§ 55-9-504, -505(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
169. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
170. 111 N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1991).
171. Id. at 738, 809 P.d at 652. For a detailed discussion of facts in this case see infra notes
273-300 and accompanying text.
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A pawnbroker can secure the pawnor's loan under the N.M.U.C.C.
in two ways. First, the pawnbroker can retain the pawned property in
satisfaction of the debt and forego any deficiency judgment. 72 To do
so, however, the pawnbroker must notify the pawnor of his intention
to retain the pawned item and allow twenty-one days to object. 7 The
pawnor can object, automatically forcing the pawnbroker to sell the
pawned property. 7 4 On the other hand, if the pawnor does not object,
the pawnbroker may retain the pawned property in satisfaction of the

debt. '71
Second, the pawnbroker may sell the pawned property to satisfy the
debt. 76 The pawnbroker, however, must notify the debtor (pawnor) of
the intent to dispose of the secured property. 77 In the notice, the pawnbroker must notify the pawnor of the time, place, and manner of the
disposition to allow reasonable time for the pawnor to participate in the
sale. 78 After the pawned property is sold, the pawnbroker must account
to the debtor for any surplus. 7 9 Therefore, the pawnbroker's notice to
the pawnor informs the pawnor as to whether the pawnbroker intends
to claim ownership' 80 or to act as an agent 8 ' for the pawnor in the sale
172. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-505(2) (Repi. Pamp. 1987).
173. Id.
174. Id. (The pawnbroker must comply with N.M.U.C.C. § 55-9-504 when selling the collateral).
175. Id.
176. Id.§ 55-9-504.
177. Id.(emphasis added). "Reasonable notification ... must be sent in such time that persons
entitled to receive it will have sufficient time to take appropriate steps to protect their interests by
taking part in the sale or other disposition if they so desire." Id. comment 5. No additional notice
is required if the chattel is a consumer good. Id. § 55-9-504(3).
178. Id. § 55-9-504.
179. Id. § 55-9-504(2), (3). While section 56-12-11 of the Pawnbrokers Act requires a pawnbroker
to comply with the N.M.U.C.C § 55-9-504 when selling collateral to satisfy the debt, the Pawnbrokers
Act specifically addresses how a pawnbroker must notify the pawnor of any surplus. The Pawnbrokers
surplus notification requirement only differs from the N.M.U.C.C.'s surplus notification requirement
in that the Pawnbrokers Act distinguishes between surplus less than or equal to $100 and surplus
greater than $100 and gives the pawnor a shorter reclaim period for surplus less than $100. The
N.M.U.C.C. makes no such distinction. A pawnbroker must perform the following acts to insure
the pawnor receives proper notification that he is entitled to the surplus:
[Ilf a surplus remains after sale of the pledged property the pawnbroker must make
a record of the sale and the amount of the surplus and must notify the pledgor
by first class mail sent to the pledgor's last known address of the amount of the
surplus and the pledgor's right to claim it at a specified location within ninety
days of the date of mailing of the notice if the surplus is one hundred dollars
($100) or less, or within twelve months of the date of the mailing of the notice
if the surplus is greater than one hundred dollars ($100). In the event that the first
class mail addressed to any person is returned unclaimed to the pawnbroker, then
the pawnbroker must post and maintain on a conspicuous public part of his premises
an appropriately entitled list naming each such person. Ninety days or twelve months,
as applicable, after the date of such mailing or posting whichever is later, the
pawnbroker may retain any surplus remaining unclaimed by the pledgor as his own
property.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-11(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (emphasis added).
180. If the pawnbroker decides to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt under N.M.U.C.C.
§ 55-9-505(2) and notifies the pawnor accordingly, the pawnbroker is demonstrating its intent to
claim ownership over the collateral.
181. If the pawnbroker decides to sell the collateral in satisfaction of the debt under N.M.U.C.C.
§ 55-9-504 and notifies the pawnor accordingly, the pawnbroker is demonstrating its intent to act
as an agent for the pawnor in satisfying the debt.
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of the property securing the debt. If Wing intended to sell the collateral,
rather then retain ownership to satisfy the debt, the sale of the collateral
is exempt from gross receipts tax. 82 The taxation statutes"s3 exempt
principal, interest, and loan handling charges from gross receipts tax.'8
Therefore, accurate and detailed transaction records, for each item pawned
and later sold to the public, allows one to trace these three basic receipt
components associated with the transaction.
For example, recall the results of the Wing audit: The Taxation and
Revenue Department found that Wing Pawn Shop loaned a pawnor $75
for a gun and later sold it for $125.55.185 Suppose the pawnbroker incurred
costs of $5.55 in handling the original loan and also earned $10 in accrued
interest.'86 Then, the pawnbroker is exempt from paying gross receipts
taxes on the $5.55 handling costs, the $10 in interest, and the principal
loan amount. 8 7 The only amount remaining is the $40 surplus. The
N.M.U.C.C. requires that the pawnbroker notify the pawnor of the $40
surplus'88 and allow the pawnor ninety days to respond. 8 9 If the pawnor
responds to the notice and receives the $40 surplus, the pawnbroker's
entire sale of the pawned property is tax exempt because the component
sums, excluding the surplus, are exempt. The pawnbroker, however, must
keep sufficient records to prove the various component sums (cost, principal, interest, and surplus) are exempt from a gross receipt tax.' 9° Refunding the surplus to the pawnor is evidence proving that the pawnbroker
was acting as an agent for the pawnor.19g
In the transaction examined by the court, Wing loaned $75 to a pawnor
and received a handgun as collateral. 92 Upon the pawnor's default, Wing
sent the pawnor a notice stating that Wing "proposes to dispose of the
[property] in satisfaction of [the pawnor's] obligation."'' 93 Wing then sold
the gun for $125.55 to secure the pawnor's defaulted loan, but Wing

182. Wing Pawn Shop, 111 N.M. at 741, 809 P.2d at 655.
183. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-1-1 to -18A-7 (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
184. Id.
185. Wing Pawn Shop, I11 N.M. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.

186. Security Escrow v. Taxation & Rev. Dep't, 107 N.M. 540, 760 P.2d 1306 (Ct. App. 1988)
(legislature intended to allow the deduction from gross receipts only for typical loan transactions
involving both a traditional lender and borrower).
187. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-61.1, 7-9-25, 7-9-3(F) (Repl. Pamp. 1990 & Cum. Supp. 1992) (a
return of loan principal does not fall within the definitions of gross receipts).
188. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
189. See supra note 179.

190. "[Wing] was unable to point to records of his costs and lost interest on defaulted loans."
Wing Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 738-39, 809 P.2d at 652-53 (emphasis added). "[T]he pawnbroker
must make a record of the sale and the amount of the surplus ...-N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12II(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (emphasis added). Therefore, maintaining records is evidence that the
pawnbroker is acting as an agent for the pawnor.
191. The court concluded that Wing sold the collateral with an intent to retain ownership and
not account to the pawnors for any surplus over the amount necessary to satisfy the debt. Wing
Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654. From this conclusion, the court found that Wing
was not acting as an agent for the pawnors. Id. Therefore, a pawnbroker's surplus refund to a
pawnor is at least evidence that the pawnbroker is acting as an agent for the pawnor.
192. Id. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
193. Id.
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failed to refund the surplus of, at most, $50.55 to the pawnor.'9 Wing
claimed that this surplus covered the interest on the loan and other
costs. 9 The court of appeals examined Wing's transactions to determine
whether Wing owned the property it sold or whether Wing was simply
acting as an agent for the pawnor when it sold the property.'9
The court agreed that the return of loan principal and interest are
exempt from gross receipts tax and that loan handling charges are deductible.' 7 The court found, however, that Wing was unable to produce
records proving what surplus "amount was attributable to costs and
interests for any particular item he sold."' 9 Hence, Wing was unable to
support its claim that the entire surplus covered loan costs and interest.
This lack of records is evidence that Wing intended to retain ownership
and then sell the items rather than act as an agent for the pawnor. I9
The court then examined whether Wing complied with the N.M.U.C.C.'s
notice requirements."O
The court of appeals held that Wing's generic notice to dispose of the
collateral did not satisfy either of the N.M.U.C.C.'s "disposition" provisions. 20' The court found that if Wing intended to claim ownership
over the collateral to satisfy the debt, the notice failed to notify the
pawnor of his right to object within twenty-one days 20 2 and redeem 2 3
the collateral or force Wing to sell the collateral. 2°0 The court also found
that if Wing intended to sell the collateral to satisfy the debt, Wing
failed to notify the pawnor of any surplus proceeds from the sale. 20 5
Hence, Wing did not act as an agent for the pawnor to secure the debt,
but rather, through its insufficient notices to dispose of the property and
to refund the surplus, Wing acted as the owner of the property. 2° As
the court noted, when a creditor or pawnbroker, retains the collateral
to secure the debt, he becomes the owner.2'0 Thus, when a pawnbroker
sells the "retained" collateral, he is no longer acting as an agent, to
secure the pawnor's debt but is acting as a "purveyor" of used property

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654. The court determined that if the pawnbroker took ownership
of the collateral and later sold it then he was acting as a "purveyor of used chattel" and not as
an agent for the pawnor. Therefore, the pawnbroker would be subject to the taxation statutes. Id.
197. Id. at 739, 809 P.2d at 653.
198. Id.
199. See supra note 190.
200. Wing Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
201. Id. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
202. Id.
203. "[T~he debtor . . . may unless otherwise agreed in writing after default redeem the collateral
by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral .
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 559-506 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
204. "If the secured party receives objection in writing from a person entitled to receive notification
within twenty-one days after the notice was sent, the secured party must dispose of the collateral
under Section 9-504 [55-9-504]." Id. § 55-9-505(2).
205. See supra notes 175-79 and accompanying text.
206. Wing Pawn Shop, I I N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
207. Id.
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- a person selling used property, which he owns, for profit. 20 Therefore,
the court held that Wing sold its property and, therefore, was subject
to the taxation statutes.
The court of appeals impliedly established the following as the test to
determine whether a pawnbroker's receipts are exempt from gross receipts
tax. Did the pawnbroker's notice to the pawnor to sell the collateral and
refund all surplus comply with the N.M.U.C.C. and the Pawnbroker's
Act? If the answer is yes, then the pawnbroker's receipts from the sale
of the collateral are tax exempt because the pawnbroker acted as an
agent for the pawnor to secure the debt. 2°9 On the other hand, did the
pawnbroker's notice to the pawnor to retain the collateral comply with
the N.M.U.C.C.? If the answer is yes, the pawnbroker's receipts from
the sale of its property are subject to the taxation statutes because the
pawnbroker sold its personal property. 210 If the pawnbroker's notice failed
to comply with either of the N.M.U.C.C.'s "retain" or "sell" provisions,
the court examines whether the pawnbroker's acts demonstrated its intent
to retain ownership. Did the pawnbroker sell the collateral with "an
intention to: (1) retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt; and (2)

not account to the pawnors after sale." ' 21 If the answer is yes, then the
pawnbroker's receipts from the sale of its property are subject to the
21 2
taxation statutes.
In analyzing the court of appeals decision, a pawnbroker must pay
gross receipts taxes where the following are shown: (1) the pawnbroker
retained the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, and hence is now the
owner of the pawned property; 21 3 and (2) the pawnbroker sold the pawned
property for profit. 214 One can plausibly infer the following from the
court of appeals' analysis: if the pawnbroker does not notify the pawnor
of the surplus and does not refund the surplus, then the pawnbroker is
demonstrating his prior intent 215 to claim ownership and not sell the
property in satisfaction of the debt. 2 6 For example, if Wing Pawn Shop
208. See Reeves v. Foutz & Tanner, Inc., 94 N.M. 760, 617 P.2d 149 (1980).
209. The pawnbroker is demonstrating its intent to act "as an agent for the pawnors to fulfill
their obligations." Wing Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654. It is reasonable that the
court may determine that a portion of the sales receipts is exempt and a portion is not exempt.
For example, a pawnbroker may have accurate records on the principal and costs, while having
poor or no records of interest earned on the loan. In this situation the court is likely to subject
the pawnbroker's claimed interest to the taxation statutes. See supra note 190.
210. The pawnbroker is demonstrating its intent to take "ownership of the [property] from the
pawnors, [make] it part of his inventory, and then [sell] it ..

..

He [is] ... acting as a purveyor

of used [property]." Wing Pawn Shop, IIl N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
212. See supra note 210.
213. A pawnbroker's intention to become owner is shown when it fails to comply with the
N.M.U.C.C. disposition provisions. See supra notes 190-202 and accompanying text.
214. Wing Pawn Shop, I ll N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
215. "Prior intent" refers to the pawnbroker's intent, prior to selling the collateral, to claim
ownership over the collateral.
216. Wing Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654 (stating that a pawnbroker's intention
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt and not account to the pawnors may not fit
within any commercial practice the N.M.U.C.C. authorizes. Furthermore, when a pawnbroker retains
the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, he becomes the owner).
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acted as an agent for the pawnor to secure the debt, Wing Pawn Shop
would have refunded the surplus to the pawnor. Thus, Wing would
recognize that the pawnor still had an interest in the merchandise to the
extent that the pawnor was entitled to the difference between his debt
and the amount received for the sale of the merchandise.
Wing, however, did not refund the surplus, which is evidence that
Wing Pawn Shop previously intended to retain absolute dominion and
control over the gun to the exclusion of the pawnor. 217 Thus, Wing Pawn
Shop intended to claim ownership of the gun. A pawnbroker, however,
can take precautions to avoid the "owner or agent" question.
The pawnbroker can ensure that sales of pawned property are exempt
from the taxation statutes by complying with the Pawnbrokers Act. 2 8,
The pawnbroker should keep accurate and detailed records of each part
of all transactions. 2 9 After loaning a pawnor cash in exchange for an
item, the pawnor should record the loan amount, deductions in the
principal balance (as the pawnor makes payments), and the accrued
monthly interest on the principal balance. 0 These complete records will
enable the pawnbroker to establish a resale price based on lost interest,
the unpaid balance, and on the property's market value. In addition,
the pawnbroker should record any reasonable maintenance costs necessary
to retain the property's market value. These records are evidence that
the pawnbroker is acting as an agent for the pawnor because the pawnattribute sales receipts to principal, interest, costs,
broker can accurately
22
and surplus. '
At this point the pawnbroker can determine whether selling the property
or retaining it in satisfaction of the debt is most advantageous. The
notice to retain the property must inform the pawnor of his twenty-one
day grace period to redeem the property. During this twenty-one day
grace period the pawnor can object to the pawnbroker's proposed intent
to retain the collateral and compel a sale of the collateral. The notice
to the pawnor to sell the property must include the time, place, and
manner of the disposition to allow reasonable time for the pawnor to
participate in the sale. 2 2 Upon selling the property the pawnbroker must
notify the pawnor of the surplus proceeds calculated from the detailed
records of the transaction. "'3 The pawnbroker must then pay the pawnor
the surplus amount if the pawnor responds to the notice. 224 The pawn-

217. The facts indicate that Wing, at times, exercised exclusive dominion and control over the
collateral after the pawnor defaulted on the loan. Id. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
218. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-12-1 to -16 (Repl. Pamp 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
219. Additionally, the pawnbroker "must make a record of the sale and the amount of surplus .... " N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) (Repl. Pamp 1987).
220. The appellate court noted that although Wing claimed the receipts from the sale of collateral
covered principal, interest, and costs, Wing "was unable to point to records of his costs and lost
interest on defaulted loans." Wing Pawn Shop, IIl N.M. at 738-39, 809 P.2d at 652-53 (emphasis
added).
221. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
222. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
223. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
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broker should require the pawnor to sign a receipt for the surplus
received. 22 In this situation, the pawnbroker is clearly acting as an agent
for the pawnor and is exempt from the taxation statutes.
IV. MORTGAGES
During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided
purchase-money mortgages m and due-on-sale clauses within
issues involving
227
mortgages.
Refinancing an Existing Real Estate Mortgage Does Not Create a
Purchase-Money Mortgage
A "purchase-money mortgage" is a mortgage executed at the same
time as a deed, or "during negotiations involving an agreement as part
of one continuous transaction, in favor of a vendor or a third-party
lender who pays the purchase price to the vendor, provided money was
loaned for this purpose. ' 228 Other jurisdictions have held that in determining lien-holder priority for a purchase-money mortgage, a judgment
the mortgage of the party who
lien cannot attach to the property before
229
advances the purchase money attaches.
In C & L Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Texas American Bank, 230 the New
Mexico Supreme Court examined the purchase-money mortgage exception
to statutory mortgage laws and the relation of subrogation to a purchasemoney mortgage. 23 ' In 1980, Joe McDermott purchased a small tract of
land (1.7 acres) next to a racetrack in Ruidoso from the Wests for
$90,000.232 He paid $10,000 down and entered into a real estate contract
for the balance. 233 In 1981, he purchased an adjacent 6.4 acre tract for
$300,000 from the Wests. 23 4 He paid $200,000 cash, which he obtained
$100,000 was
from a loan through Ruidoso State Bank. 235 The remaining
23 6
financed through a second mortgage to the Wests.
A.

225. The courts look to "records" as evidence that a pawnbroker allocated all receipts from the
sale of collateral appropriately. See Wing Pawn Shop, I II N.M. at 740, 809 P.2d at 654.
226. C & L Lumber v. Texas Am. Bank, 110 N.M. 291, 795 P.2d 502 (1990).
227. Los Quatros, Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 110 N.M. 750, 800 P.2d 184 (1990).
228. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-13(A) (1978); see also Davidson v. Click, 31 N.M. 543, 249 P.
100 (1926).
229. See, e.g., Liberty Parts Warehouse, Inc. v. Marshall County Bank & Trust, 459 N.E.2d
738, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
230. 110 N.M. 291, 795 P.2d 502 (1990).
231. Id. at 293, 795 P.2d at 504.
232. Id. At the time, Joe McDermott was married to Dixie McDermott. Id. The deeds, however,
were "executed by McDermott as 'a married man dealing with his sole and separate property."'
Id. American Bank argued as a separate cause of action that this wording raised a presumption
that the property was McDermott's separate property, not subject to New Mexico's community
property provisions. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. The Wests were given a second mortgage on both tracts of land. Id.
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In 1983, McDermott borrowed $200,000 from the Texas American
Bank ("American Bank") to pay off the Ruidoso State Bank loan. 237 In
return, American Bank obtained a mortgage on the large tract. 238 American
Bank also entered into a subordination agreement with the Wests, which
was intended to place American Bank in first position over the Wests'
1981 mortgage. 23 9 Later that same year, McDermott borrowed another
$120,000 from American Bank.24° He used $60,000 to pay the real estate
contract on the smaller tract to the Wests. 241 Again, American Bank was
given a mortgage on the small tract of land, which was to be superior
to the mortgage of the Wests under the terms of the subordination
agreement. 242 The-promissory notes to American Bank were due within
six months from the date of execution. 243 The loans, however, were
44
extended at various times between September 1984 and March 1985.2
Dixie McDermott never executed any of the contracts. 241 In 1984, the
McDermotts were divorced, and Dixie conveyed to Joe her community
property interest in the land by a special warranty deed. 24 In 1986, horse
barns were constructed on the two parcels of land. 247 The materials supplier
for the project, C & L Lumber, "brought suit ' in
December, 1986, to
'2
foreclose its materialmen's lien on the property. 4
In the foreclosure proceeding, the district court determined the lien
priority holders as American Bank, the Wests, C & L Lumber, and
others .249 Because Dixie McDermott never executed the mortgage agreements, the district court held that American Bank was not entitled to
first priority as to either of the tracts. 2 0 As to the small tract, the court
determined that C & L Lumber was the first priority holder, followed
by three parties not related to the suit, and that American Bank was
the last priority holder. 25' As to the large tract, the court determined
that the Wests were the first priority holder, the mechanics' and ma-

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (emphasis added). New Mexico is a community property state, meaning that any assets
acquired during marriage are presumed to be owned equally by both spouses. Except for purchasemoney mortgages, spouses must join in all mortgages of community real property. Any attempt to

mortgage community property by only one spouse is void. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-13(A) (Repl.
Pamp. 1989).
251. C & L Lumber, I 10 N.M. at 293, 795 P.2d at 504. Five parties were noted as lien holders
on the small tract of land. Additionally, the district court found American Bank's mortgages void
at the time of execution, and found that their mortgages were not purchase-money mortgages. See
id. at 292, 795 P.2d at 503; see also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-13(A).
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American Bank
terialmen's lien claimants the second priority holder and
2 2 American Bank appealed.2 1
the third' priority holder.
As to the large tract, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with
American Bank, finding that "the original financing by the Ruidoso State
Bank [with McDermott] created a purchase-money mortgage in favor of
Ruidoso State Bank. ' 254 The court found that McDermott granted the
mortgage as part of the same transaction in which Ruidoso State Bank
executed the deed of purchase transferring title to the property. 25 When
McDermott refinanced the Ruidoso State Bank loan through Texas American Bank, however, the court found that a second purchase-money
mortgage was not created in favor of American Bank. 2 6 The court
reasoned that because "title had already passed to McDermott as part
of the original financing transaction" with Ruidoso State Bank, McDermott was already indebted to Ruidoso State Bank for the full loan
amount. 25 7 Any subsequent refinancing, the court held, was for discharging
the loan obligation to Ruidoso State Bank, not for the acquisition of
the title in the property. 258 Therefore, no purchase-money mortgage could
be created.

25 9

Additionally, American Bank argued that its loan to McDermott for
the small tract allowed him to pay off a real estate contract with the
Wests which created a purchase-money mortgage. 260 The court disagreed,
and instead held that "under New Mexico law, a mortgage executed for
the purpose of paying off a land sales contract is itself not a purchasemoney mortgage." ' 26' The court noted that before refinancing, various
liens may exist on the property under previous property sales contracts. 262

252. C & L Lumber, 110 N.M. at 292, 795 P.2d at 503. Three parties were noted as lien holders
on the large tract of land.
253. Id. at 292-93, 795 P.2d at 503-04.
254. Id. at 295, 795 P.2d at 506. The trial court had originally held that the financing between
McDermott and Ruidoso State Bank did not create a purchase-money mortgage. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.at 296, 795 P.2d at 507.
261. Id.at 295, 795 P.2d at 506. The court disagreed with the decision in Liberty Parts Warehouse,
Inc. v. Marshall County Bank & Trust, 459 N.E.2d 738, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), which held
that a refinancing mortgage, under the guise of a purchase-money mortgage, is entitled to first
priority over all other existing liens. Instead, the court stated:
In New Mexico, the purchaser's equitable estate under a land sales contract is an
estate in property. He is treated as the owner and his interest in the property is
subject to a judgment lien. Thus, various liens in fact may attach themselves to
property under a land sales contract prior to the execution of a refinancing loan
and mortgage. To hold that such a refinancing mortgage was a purchase-money
mortgage, entitled to priority over all other liens, would ignore both the earlier
attachment of these liens and the possible inequity in subordinating them to the
refinancing agreement. We conclude that under New Mexico law a mortgage executed
for the purpose of paying off a land sales contract is itself not a purchase-money
mortgage.
C & L Lumber, 110 N.M. at 295-96, 795 P.2d at 506-07 (citations omitted).
262. C & L Lumber, 110 N.M. at 296, 795 P.2d at 507.
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The court held that a purchase-money mortgage refinancing on an existing
mortgage "was junior to" existing liens on the property36 3
The bank further argued that because of the refinancing, it possessed
subrogation rights to the purchase-money mortgage position of the original
lender, Ruidoso State Bank.2 " The court held that subrogation is generally
not allowed when a third party, such as American Bank, pays the debt
of another without any duty or compulsion to do so. 2 6 1 Because American
Bank did not receive an assignment of the rights to the mortgages from
either Ruidoso State Bank or the Wests, it failed to qualify as a party
with subrogation rights to the purchase-money mortgage. 266
C & L Lumber demonstrates that in New Mexico, purchase-money
mortgages cannot be superior to existing liens on a mortgage, even if
the mortgage has been refinanced. Additionally, if a mortgage is refinanced, a duty or compulsion to pay must exist between the financier
and the third party financee for subrogation rights to exist.2 67 Once
subrogation rights are assigned, this decision implies that a purchasemoney mortgage will then exist in favor of the assignee.
V.

THE ACT CASES

During the survey year, New Mexico appellate courts considered a
variety of cases involving several of New Mexico's commercial enactments.
The cases are analyzed in accordance with the acts which govern them.
The Pawnbrokers Act
The purpose of the Pawnbrokers Act is to protect people that rely
upon money or credit extended by pawnbrokers from exploitation, fraud,
and unfair practices. 26 1 More specifically, the Pawnbrokers Act regulates
pawn transactions by regulating the acquiescence and disposition of tangible personal property. 26 9 The Act focuses on the protection of the
pawnor; 270 one who gives the pawnbroker personal property as security
for a loan which creates a security interest, in the pawnbroker's favor.2 71
For example, the Act requires the pawnbroker to notify the pawnor
before selling the pawned item. 272 During the period, the New Mexico
A.

263. Id. at 295, 795 P.2d at 506. The court found that this may result in an inequity by
subordinating existing liens through the refinancing agreement. Id.
264. Id. at 296, 795 P.2d at 507.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-1-201 (1978) (defining "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation").
272. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-1 1(A) (pawnbroker must comply with section 55-9-504 of N.M.U.C.C.).
Section 55-9-504(3) of the N.M.U.C.C. requires that the seller of collateral give the debtor reasonable
notification of the sale to satisfy a debt. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)
(emphasis added).
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Court of Appeals examined the circumstances under which a sale by a
pawnbroker is exempt from gross receipts tax.
In Wing Pawn Shop v. Taxation and Revenue Department,273 the
Department of Taxation and Revenue audited the pawnbroker's business
for the years 1982 through 1985. 274 The Department only investigated the
transaction in which Wing Pawn Shop took property as collateral 275 for
a loan and later sold the property after the borrower defaulted on the
loan. 276 Wing Pawn Shop ("Wing") described its loan securing process
as follows. The borrower (pawnor) brings personal property to the pawn
shop and Wing loans the pawnor cash for the item. 277 The pawnor has
the chattel if he pays back the cash plus
an absolute right to redeem
278
days.
120
within
interest
If the pawnor fails to satisfy the redeeming criteria, Wing sends the
pawnor a written notice of default which states that the pawn shop
"proposes to dispose of the [chattel] in satisfaction of [the pawnor's]
obligation," and the pawnor receives no further notice. 279 Wing then
either retains the property as its own by exercising exclusive dominion
over the property, or offers it for sale to the public.m In the latter
instance, Wing determines the resale price based on the principal loan,
accrued interest, repair costs and market value. 28 1 The results of the audit
were based on sixteen transactions showing that Wing earned substantial
sums on the sale of each pawned item. 28 2 For example, the pawnbroker
loaned a pawnor $75 for a gun and sold it for $125.55.283
Wing claimed there was no surplus money because any money received
above the amount of the loan covered costs such as loan setup charges,
chattel maintenance, disposal costs, 2 " and accrued interest. 28 5 Wing also
claimed the loan principal was exempt from gross receipts tax. 2" Because
Wing liquidated the pledged chattel, it maintained that it came within

273. Il N.M. 735, 809 P.2d 649 (Ct. App. 1991).
274. Id. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
275. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-105 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) (defining "collateral" as the property
which "is subject to a security interest").
276. Wing Pawn Shop, 111 N.M. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652. The Act limits the interest rate or "pawn service charge" that
a pawnbroker can charge the pawnor. The pawnbroker can charge $7.50 or ten percent of the loan
amount, whichever is greater, for the first thirty-day period of the pawn transaction. The pawnbroker
can only charge a maximum interest rate of four percent per month on the unpaid principal balance
of the loan for the remaining pawn transaction period. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-13 (Repl. Pamp.
1986).
279. Wing Pawn Shop, II1 N.M. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. The parties agreed that these transactions were typical of Wing's everyday business
activities. Id.
284. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-61.1 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (deduct receipts from gross receipts tax if
the receipts cover charges made for handling loan payments).
285. Id. § 7-9-25 (this statute exempts receipts for interest earned on money loaned from gross
receipts tax).
286. d. § 7-9-3(F).
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the exception from the taxation statutes.21 7 Nevertheless, based upon the
audit and testimony from the formal hearing before the Department, the
2
Department found that Wing owed $11,460.11. 88
The department based its finding on the fact that Wing could not
distinguish between the cash proceeds received for the item's market value
from the cash proceeds attributable to costs and interest on the loan
amount for that item. 28 9 Hence, Wing could not prove that the difference
between the proceeds received from the sale and the original loan amount
was equal to Wing's costs and lost interest. 290 As a result, the Department
issued an order denying Wing's protest of the gross receipts tax. Wing
appealed the Department's decision. 29'
The New Mexico Court of Appeals 292 faced an issue of first impression:
does a pawnbroker's receipts from the sale of pawned chattels represent
funds that are exempt from gross receipts taxes as the return of principal
and cost associated with the loan transaction? 293 In affirming the Department's decision, the court of appeals held that the Pawnbrokers Act
did not apply in this case. 294 The Pawnbrokers Act does not indicate the
Act's effective date. Therefore, the court of appeals applied the New
Mexico Constitution, article IV, § 23 to determine that the effective date
of the Pawnbrokers Act was June 14, 1985.295 Evidently, Wing's transactions occurred prior to the Act's effective date as the court of appeals
stated "the Act only applies to those pawns arising after the effective
' 296 Because
date of the Act."
the Pawnbrokers Act did not apply to this
case, the court of appeals relied upon the remedies of the New Mexico
Uniform Commercial Code to explain its holding. 297 Nevertheless, had
the court of appeals focused on the Pawnbrokers Act, it would have
obtained a result similarto the one it obtained by using the N.M.U.C.C. 298
Assuming the Pawnbrokers Act does apply to the Wing case, are the
pawnbrokers questioned sales of pawned items subject to gross receipts
tax? The answer hinges on how the pawnbroker disposed of the chattels
to secure the various debts. The Pawnbrokers Act states that upon default
by the pledgor, the pawnbroker must comply with the requirements of

287. Wing Pawn Shop, 111 N.M. at 739, 809 P.2d at 653.
288. Id. at 737-38, 809 P.2d at 651-52.
289. Id. at 738-39, 809 P.2d at 652-53. Wing's records did not show its costs and lost interest
on defaulted loans.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 737, 809 P.2d at 651.
292. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-22 (Repl. Pamp. 1990) (stating that no court has jurisdiction
over a proceeding by a taxpayer who questions his liability for any tax, except by his appeal to
the court of appeals from the action).
293. Wing Pawn Shop, Ill N.M. at 738, 809 P.2d at 652.
294. Id. at 739, 809 P.2d at 653.
295. Id.
296. Id. (emphasis added).
297. Id. The court states: "Upon a pawnor's default, [the pawnbroker] had two choices under
the UCC." For a detailed discussion regarding the court's analysis of these transactions see supra,
notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
298. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-12-11 (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (this section requires that the pawnbroker,
upon disposing property, comply with New Mexico's Uniform Commercial Code).
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sections "55-9-501 through 55-9-507 NMSA 1978 in the disposition of
the pledged goods. ' '299 A pawnbroker's disposition of pawned property
must be performed in accordance with New Mexico's version of the
U.C.C. to insure the pawnbroker avoids gross receipts tax when selling
pawned property." Therefore, the Pawnbrokers Act must be read in
conjunction with the U.C.C. in all transactions involving the retention
and resale of property by a pawnbroker.
New Mexico Securities Act
The general purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the public from
various deceitful and fraudulent methods employed in the sale of securities. 30 ' As a result, the Securities Act requires a security owner to
register 30 2 the security prior to selling it or apply for an exemption from
registration. 30 3 A person who sells a security in violation of the Securities
Act can cure the violation by offering to repurchase the security from
the buyer. 30 During the survey period, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
examined the requirements under the Securities Act to cure a violation
through an offer to repurchase the stock. In addition, the court examined
whether the Securities Act provided the exclusive method of recovery
where a violation is found.
In Naranjo v. Paull,3 5 Raymond and Fil Naranjo invested in two oil
and gas limited partnerships known as GF83 Limited and ABO 84
Limited. 306 Mr. and Mrs. Les Paull served as the directors of Paull
Petroleum Corporation ("Paull Corp."), which was the general partner
for both limited partnerships. 307 Mr. Paull was the president and treasurer
of Paull Corp. and Mrs. Paull was the vice-president and secretary.M
The securities sold to the Naranjos were never registered or exempted.3
Sometime after Mr. Paull sold the Naranjos the securities, he sent two
letters, the GF 83 LTD Newsletter and the ABO 84 LTD Newsletter, to
all limited partners. 3 0 Mr. Paull was confident that the oil and gas wells
would soon begin to "yield the fruits of [their] labors."3 3 1' In fact, Mr.
Paull was so confident that he made an offer to purchase anyone's
312
interest in either of the partnerships for cost plus annual interest.
Specifically, Mr. Paull made an offer to purchase any limited partner's
B.

299. Id. § 56-12-11.
300. For a complete analysis of a pawnbroker's sales of pawned property, see Secured Transactions,
supra section I1.
301. White v. Solomon, 105 N.M. 366, 368, 732 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Ct. App. 1986).
302. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-20 (Repi. Pamp. 1991).
303. Id.§ 58-13B-26.
304. Id. § 58-13B-42(1)(a) to -42(1)(d).
305. 111 N.M. 165, 803 P.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1990).
306. Id. at 166, 803 P.2d at 255.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.at 167, 803 P.2d at 256.
311. Id.
312. Id.
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interest, including the Naranjos' interest.' 3 Mr. Paull's offer explained
he would pay any limited partner 125%o of his or her investment in
exchange for his or her interest in the partnership. 14 The repurchase
offer was valid for a period of thirty days. 1 5 The Naranjos did not take
advantage of Paull's offer to repurchase and later incurred losses in their
investments.31 6 As a result, the Naranjos sued Paull Corp. and the limited
37
partnerships for securities fraud.
The district court held a bench trial and found that Mr. Paull made
various misrepresentations that the Naranjos relied upon in their decision
to invest in the oil and gas partnerships."" In addition, the district held
that the limited partnership interests were securities and found that Mr.
Paull failed to register them or apply for exemption from registration. 1 9
Although Mr. Paull argued his offer of rescission barred3 20 the Naranjos
suit, the district court held that the rescissions did not contain sufficient
information to bar the suit.3 2 ' Specifically, Mr. Paull did not disclose in
the rescission offers the misrepresentations he made to the Naranjos1 22
Thus, the district court awarded compensatory damages to the Naranjos
under the Securities Act and punitive damages.3 3 Mr. Paull appealed the
decision. 2a The Naranjos cross-appealed. 31
The New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the following issues on
appeal: (1) What are the requirements under the Securities Act to cure
a violation through an offer to repurchase stock? (2) What is the method
to be used in determining an offset for the value of stock exchanged
for interest in securities? (3) Is the Securities Act the exclusive method
of recovery where a violation is found?
Because the conduct that gave rise to this action took place during
the years 1983 and 1984, the court applied the prior version of the Act.3 26

313. Id.
314. Id. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 166, 803 P.2d at 255.
318. Id. at 166-67, 803 P.2d at 255-56.
319. Id at 166, 803 P.2d at 255.
320. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B42(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
321. The district court held that Mr. Paull did not disclose his earlier misrepresentations when
he made his repurchase offer to the Naranjos. Naranjo, Ill N.M. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 167, 803 P.2d at 256.
324. Id.

325. Id. The Naranjos claimed that they were entitled to benefit-of-the-bargain damages instead
of the mere statutory damages awarded by the district court. Id.
326. Id. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-13-1 to -47 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
The pertinent 1984 version of the Securities Act states:
No purchaser shall claim or have the benefit of this section if he refused or failed
to accept, within thirty days from the date of such offer, an offer in writing of
the seller to take back the securities in question and to refund the full amount
paid by such purchaser, together with interest on such amount for the period from
the date of payment by such purchaser to the date of repayment ....
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1342(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-1342(A) (Repl.

Pamp. 1986) (seller must disclose information necessary to cure all material misstatements or omissions
when the Act required such disclosure at the time seller sold securities to purchaser).
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Mr. Paull argued that he met the offer requirements of the Securities
Act in effect at that time: 327 a written offer to take back the securities
for a full refund including interest. 328 The court of appeals responded
by stating that the courts have a duty to recognize "what is necessarily
3 2 9 First, the court established the elements
implicit in statutory language.
of a repurchase offer necessary to cure a violation under the Securities
Act. 330 The express elements of the repurchase offer require the seller to
make an offer to buy back the securities "in exchange for the purchaser's
element requires that
net outlay, plus interest. ' ' 331 An additional expressed
332 The court of appeals then
the seller must make the offer in writing.
repurchase offer are essential
examined which implied elements of the
33
Act.
the
of
for the intended operation
purchaser has thirty
For example, the Securities Act states that the
33 If the purchaser fails
days to respond to the seller's repurchase offer.
to respond during the thirty-day time period, he is barred from recovery
under the Securities Act. 33s The Act does not expressly require the seller
to disclose the time limit. 336 The court of appeals, however, stated that
the seller must disclose the purchaser's thirty-day time limit in the repurchase offer. The court's rationale was that it "would be patently
of the Securities Act
unjust" to bar the purchaser from the benefit
337 Therefore, because the
limit.
because he was not aware of the time
of the offer, the seller must
time for response is an essential element
338
offer.
repurchase
the
disclose it in
"advise
Furthermore, the court of appeals stated that the offer 3 must
39 The court
offer.
the
of
consequences
the offeree of the statutory
'' 340 An offer sets forth the
reached this conclusion by defining "offer.
terms essential to the transaction.3' In this case, the Securities Act
forecloses the purchaser from obtaining remedies under the2 Act if he
fails or refuses to respond to the seller's repurchase offer.3 This is a
serious consequence if the Naranjos refused or failed to accept Mr.

327. Naranjo, IlI N.M. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
328. See supra note 326.
329. Naranjo. III N.M. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
330. The appellate court examined the 1984 version of the Securities Act because that version
was in effect at the time of Mr. Paull's alleged violation. Id.
331. Id. at 168-69, 803 P.2d at 257-58.
332. Id. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258.
333. Id.
334. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-42 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
335. Id.
336. Id. (does not expressly require seller to inform purchaser of the thirty day time limit); cf.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B42(A)(l)(d) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (seller must disclose in the offer the
limited time the purchaser has available to accept).
337. Naranjo, Il1 N.M. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257 (emphasis added).
340. Id. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258.
341. Id. "'In order to be legally operative and to create a power of acceptance, it is necessary
CORBIN ON
that the offer shall contain all the terms of the contract to be made." Id. (quoting
CONTRACTS § II at 26 (1963)).
342. N.M. STAT. AN. § 58-13-42 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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Paull's repurchase offer; a consequence that may have even encouraged
the Naranjos to accept Mr. Paull's offer. 3 Therefore, the court of appeals
held that the Securities Act clearly implied that an offer pursuant to the
Act must disclose the statutory consequences of the Act. 3 "
Second, Mr. Paull argued that even if he was subject to the lawsuit,
the district court improperly failed to offset the damages.34 Mr. Paull
claimed the court failed to offset the damages by an amount equal to
the value of the Texas Star Resources ("TSR") stock which he gave to
the Naranjos in exchange for the partnership investments. 346 The court
of appeals held that the evidence did not support Mr. Paull's claims for
an offset because the value of the TSR stock was too uncertain. 347 The
factors the court of appeals relied upon to determine the value of the
TSR stock include (1) the nature of the market, (2) the track record of
the stock, (3) the type of stock, and (4) the value of the assets exchanged
for the stock. 34"
The court of appeals found that the price of the TSR stock did not
arise in a bona fide market because there was no evidence of the quantity
of stock traded or purchased. 349 In addition, the court of appeals found
that TSR was a new corporation.3 a 0 The Naranjos' transaction only
occurred halfway through TSR's first fiscal year.35 ' The corporation was
authorized to issue 50,000,000 shares, but of the 7,772,000 the corporation
did issue, only 750,000 were free trading and the book value for each
outstanding share was $1.23.352 The appellate court held that these facts,
along with the fact that no market value for TSR stock was published
in the national daily reporting services for one year after the transaction,
indicate there was not a sufficient track record to determine the value
of the TSR stock.35 3 Moreover, the court found that the Naranjos received
restricted stock, not free trading stock.3 5 4 Furthermore, the Naranjos only
received twenty-five percent of the restricted stock because the corporation
escrowed the remainder until certain events occurred. 35 Finally, the Naranjos' never actually physically received any. TSR stock because Mr. Paull
was waiting for them to pay operating costs. 3 6 The court of appeals

343. Naranjo, 111 N.M. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258. "The principle that a legally binding choice
should be a knowing choice would be grossly violated if one could be foreclosed from relief under
the New Mexico Securities Act merely by remaining silent in the face of an 'offer' that did not
refer to the Act or otherwise indicate that relief under the Act would henceforth be barred." Id.
344. Id. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
345. Id.at 167, 803 P.2d at 256.
346. Id. at 170, 803 P.2d at 260.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.Outstanding stock is defined as "stock issued and in the hands of stockholders ......
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1417 (6th ed. 1990).
353. Naranjo, IIl N.M. at 170, 803 P.2d at 260.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.

Summer 19921

COMMERCIAL LAW

stated that "one indication of the value of the TSR stock is the value
357 The court held that all these
of the assets exchanged for the stock."

factors together indicate that there was not a preponderance of the

evidence showing that the Naranjos received valuable stock in the TSR

district
stock transaction. As a result, the court of appeals held3 5that
8
court correctly denied Mr. Paull credit for the TSR stock.

Finally, the court of appeals considered whether the district court erred

35 9 First, the
in awarding punitive damages against the seller of securities.

court of appeals noted that while the Securities Act does not provide a
remedy of punitive damages, it does not limit a person's rights under

common law for the sale of securities.36 Furthermore, the court found

that although the district court awarded the Naranjos actual damages
was guilty
under the Securities Act, this simply meant that Mr. Paull
36

of fraudulent misrepresentations under the Securities Act. ' These con-

Mr. Paull
clusions of fact and law did not rule out the possibility that 362
was also guilty, as the district court held, of common-law fraud. Finally,

Mr. Paull argued that a finding of common-law fraud requires a higher
standard of proof (clear and convincing evidence) than a finding 3of63
securities fraud (preponderance of the evidence standard) requires.
Therefore, Mr. Paull argued that the evidence the district court used to
find him guilty of securities fraud is not sufficient to find him guilty

of common-law fraud.36 While the appellate court implicitly agreed with

the difference in standards, the court stated that it simply could not
standard of
presume that the district court did not apply the correct
3 65
fraud.
common-law
of
guilty
proof in finding Mr. Paull
After upholding the trial court's finding of common-law fraud, the

court of appeals examined whether a seller of securities in violation of

the Securities Act is liable for punitive damages as well as for damages
3
awarded under the Securities Act. 6 The court held that a court can
to other remedies provided by the
addition
in
award punitive damages

357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.at 171, 803 P.2d at 261.
360. Id.(citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-42(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).
361. Id.at 171-72, 803 P.2d at 261-62.
362. Id. at 173, 803 P.2d at 262. Mr. Paull argued that since the district court rejected "Naranjos'
requested Findings Nos. 17, 38, and 40," the district court rejected the Naranjos' claim of common
law fraud. The appellate court, however, stated that Findings Nos. 17, 38, and 40 asserted that
the district court rejected one of a number of alleged misrepresentations by Mr. Paull, Naranjos'
request for benefit-of-the-bargain damages, and Naranjos' request for treble damages under the
Racketeering Act respectively. The appellate court held that these rejections are consistent with a
finding of common law fraud. Id. The elements of common law fraud "consists of misrepresentations
of fact, known to be untrue by the maker, and made with an intent to deceive and to induce the
other party to act in reliance thereon to his detriment." Id. at 172, 803 P.2d at 261 (quoting Cargill
v. Sherrod, 96 N.M. 431, 432-33, 631 P.2d 726, 727-28 (1981)) (emphasis added).
363. Id. at 173, 803 P.2d at 262; see also Treider v. Doherty & Co., 86 N.M. at 737, 527 P.2d
at 500 (Ct. App. 1974).
364. Naranjo, I1I N.M. at 173, 803 P.2d at 262.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 174, 803 P.2d at 263.
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Securities Act as long as the damages are nonduplicative.3 67 The Securities
Act only computes damages under an out-of-pocket-loss theory.3 6 The
buyer, however, can obtain benefit-of-the-bargain damages under the
common-law fraud theory. 6 9 In this case, the Naranjos asserted that Mr.
Paull promised them a four-to-one return on their investment.3 70 As a
result, the Naranjos claimed they were entitled to receive four times their
investment in damages under common-law fraud and the benefit-of-thebargain theories.3a7
The appellate court, however, rejected the Naranjos' argument because
the district court found that the Naranjos did not rely on Mr. Paull's
misrepresentation that they would receive a four-to-one return on their
investment.372 To the contrary, the district court rejected Naranjos' argument that Mr. Paull's representation was a misleading material representation.3 73 Moreover, the appellate court held that even if the district
court found that Mr. Paull fraudulently promised the Naranjos an investment return of four-to-one, benefit-of-the-bargain damages are only
allowed if one can prove the damages with reasonable certainty.3 74 The
appellate court stated that a promise of a four-to-one return on an
investment is too ambiguous to prove damages with reasonable certainty. 375
Therefore, the appellate court upheld the district court's calculation of
damages in accordance with the Securities Act. 376 The court of appeals
also noted that if the bargained-for or represented value of the interest
did not exceed its purchase price, then the Naranjos did receive the
benefit-of-the-bargain damages . 377 In this situation, benefit-of-the-bargain
damages is equal to out-of-pocket or recision damages. 371
The court of appeals established the elements that a seller of securities
must state in its repurchase offer to successfully cure the seller's violation
of the 1984 version of the Securities Act:37 9 (1) Offer to repurchase
securities: The seller must make an offer to buy back the securities from
the buyer in exchange for the buyer's net investment plus interest;3 0 (2)

367.
Unfair
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id. For a discussion on the relationship between punitive and statutory damages, see The
Trade Practices Act, Choice of Remedies, infra section V(D)(I)(e).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
Naranjo, 110 N.M. at 174, 108 P.2d at 263.
Id.
Id. at 174, 803 P.2d at 263.
Id.
374. Id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) (1977)) (emphasis added).
375. The appellate court went on to say that "timing is everything." For example if the four
to one return is achieved in a lump sum at the end of twenty years, the investment does not have
as great a monetary value as if the return came from smaller periodic returns over a shorter period
of time. Naranjo, II1 N.M. at 174, 803 P.2d at 263.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Note, however, that these elements are also applicable to the 1986 version of the New Mexico
Securities Act. In fact, some of the elements that the court held were implied under the 1984 Act
are now expressed elements under the 1986 Act. See infra notes 380-83 and accompanying text.
380. Naranjo, IIl N.M. at 168-69 803 P.2d at 257-58; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-42
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Offer in writing: The sellers repurchase offer to the buyer must be in
writing;3"' (3) Disclose buyer's thirty-day time limit: The seller must inform
the buyer, in the written offer, that he has thirty days to accept the
32
repurchase offer or disclose the Securities Act in the offer; 1 (4) Inform
buyer of statutory consequences or mention statute: Finally, the seller
must inform the buyer of the statutory consequences concerning the
repurchase offer." 3 The seller must inform the buyer, in the offer, that
he is
if he does not accept the repurchase offer within thirty days,
384
Act.
Securities
the
under
remedy
any
receiving
foreclosed from
To determine an offset for the value of stock exchanged for interest
in securities, the court of appeals will examine (1) the nature of the
market, (2) the track record of the stock, (3) the type of stock and (4)
38 5 The court implied that
the value of the assets exchanged for the stock.
the liquidity (type) of the stock is an indicator of the value of the stock.
One can readily determine the value of free-traded stock because it usually
is in a bonafide market and the value of the shares are published daily.
On the other hand, it is more difficult to determine the value of severely
restricted stock. This difficulty arises because share values are not published daily which is a direct result of the lack of free trading on the
open market. 3 6 Hence, if a court cannot determine the value of the
stock, as in this case, with some specificity, the court cannot arbitrarily
offset the damages.
Finally, the court of appeals held that one can receive an award of
punitive damages in addition to other remedies provided by the Securities
387 The Securities Act only
Act as long as the damages are nonduplicative.
88
computes damages under an out-of-pocket-loss theory. Hence, the buyer
can only recover the principal amount he invested to purchase the securities, including interest and attorney's fees .389 The buyer, however, can
(Repl. Pamp. 1984) (seller in violation of the Securities Act liable to buyer for full amount buyer
paid for the securities plus interest); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1991)
(purchaser entitled to recover consideration paid for securities and interest upon tendering securities
to the seller).
381. Naranjo, Ill N.M. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-42 (Repl.
Pamp. 1984) (a purchaser cannot claim the benefit "of this section" if he fails or rejects seller's
offer in writing); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-42(A)(I) (Repl. Pamp. 1991) (purchaser cannot
commence an action under "Subsection A of Section 40" of the Securities Act if he receives a
written offer).
382. Naranjo, 111 N.M. at 169, 803 P.2d at 258 (informing buyer that acceptance only open
for thirty days is implicit essential element of offer); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13-42 (Repl.
Pamp. 1984) (purchaser barred from claiming benefit "of this section" if rejects or fails to accept
seller's offer within thirty days); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-42(A)(I)(d) (Repl. Pamp. 1991)
(seller must state buyer can accept offer within specified time period disclosed in offer (but not
less than thirty days) after date of its receipt by buyer).
383. Naranjo, Ill N.M. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257. The court of appeals reasoned that the statutory
consequences of rejecting the offer was an implicit essential element of the offer. See supra notes
335-38 and accompanying text.
384. Naranjo, Ill N.M. at 168, 803 P.2d at 257.
385. See supra notes 348-58 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 353-56 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
388. Naranjo, 111 N.M. at 174, 803 P.2d at 263.
389. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-40(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
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obtain benefit-of-the-bargain damages under the common-law fraud theory.319 Benefit-of-the-bargain damages allow the buyer to recover the
value of the interest it purchased, as represented by the seller, minus
any return on the interest plus inteest.3 9' Thus, rather than simply
recovering the original investment plus interest, a buyer may also recover
the extra value that seller promised him the securities were worth.
C. The Liquor Control Act
The purpose of the Liquor Control Act3 92 is to protect the public health
and safety by regulating the sale, service, and public consumption of
alcoholic beverages.3 93 The New Mexico Supreme Court has long held
that a liquor license is considered a "privilege" rather than a "right"
to sell liquor to the general public. 31 Hence, the Act is considered a
police regulation.3 95 The Liquor Control Act prohibits a wholesaler from
initiating an action to collect on a debt for liquor sold in violation of
the Act. 396 During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court
established the definition of the word "invoice" as it relates to the Liquor
Control Act.
In Pucci Distributing Co. v. Nellos,3 97 Pucci Distributing Company
("Pucci"), a liquor wholesaler, offered a special deal on Stroh's beer
for a reduced price and allowed retailers to purchase the beer while
deferring delivery until a later date. 9 On October 12, 1985, Nellos signed
and dated a purchase order for Stroh's beer on a Pucci invoice form.3
Pucci accepted Nellos's purchase order and delivered the beer to Nellos
on October 15.4 Nellos contends that Pucci never delivered the beer or,
in the alternative, that the beer delivery violated the Liquor Control Act
because an invoice did not accompany the beer delivery.4' In addition,
Nellos alleged that Pucci did not obtain a signature from Nellos ac-

390. Stewart v. Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940).
391. Naranjo, II1 N.M. at 174, 803 P.2d at 263.
392. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3A-1 to -7, 60-4B-1 to -9, 60-4C-1 to -3, 60-5A-1 to -2, 60-6A-1
to -30, 60-6C-1 to -9, 60-7A-1 to -25, 60-7B-1 to -12, and 60-8A-1 to -19 (Repl. Pamp. 1991).
393. Id. § 60-3A-2.
394. "Such [liquor] license is a privilege and not property within the meaning of the due process
and contract clauses of the constitutions of the State and the nation, and in them licensees have
no vested property rights." Baca v. Grisolano, 57 N.M. 176, 187, 256 P.2d 792, 803 (1953) (quoting
Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. at 400, 129 P.2d at 644 (1942)).
395. "The liquor control act is a police regulation and its purpose is, as stated therein, to protect
the public health, safety and morals of every community in this State .... " Baca, 57 N.M. at
187, 256 P.2d at 803 (1953) (quoting Chiordi v. Jernigan, 46 N.M. 396, 400, 129 P.2d 640, 642
(1942)).
396. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1992).
397. 110 N.M. 374, 796 P.2d 595 (1990).
398. Id. at 375, 796 P.2d at 596 (emphasis added).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. The applicable portion. of the Act states: "Whenever a New Mexico wholesaler delivers
any item of alcoholic beverages to a New Mexico retailer ... the delivery shall be accompanied
by an invoice which accurately and clearly shows the date of the sale and the quantity of each
item of merchandise delivered." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1992) (emphasis added).
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2
knowledging delivery which was contrary to Pucci's normal practice.4
Nellos refused to pay the $19,320 for the 2,400 cases of Stroh's beer
delivered by Pucci 3
Pucci sued Nellos.404 Nellos raised as an affirmative defense Pucci's
failure to deliver an invoice with the beer in violation of the Liquor
Control Act. 405 Nellos argued that the document he signed on October
12 was merely a pre-bill or purchase order and that Pucci never delivered
an invoice of any kind.4 The district court rejected Nellos's argument
and found that the October 12 document signed by Nellos was an
invoice.4 The district court awarded Pucci $19,320. In addition, the trial
court awarded Pucci $10,702.75 for prejudgment interest, and $10,000
for attorney's fees and costs.4 Nellos appealed.4
issue of what
The New Mexico Supreme Court was presented with the
410 Also, if the
Act.
Control
Liquor
the
under
invoice
constitutes an
of
document was in fact an invoice, did a copy accompany the delivery
41 '
Act.
Control
Liquor
the
under
required
as
Pucci
by
the beer
The supreme court rejected Pucci's interpretation of the definition of
an invoice under the Liquor Control Act. The court held that the contents
of Nellos's purchase order was an invoice and affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. 41 2 The court determined that an invoice is a written
account of the merchandise shipped or to be shipped to the purchaser
43
that contains the quantity and value or prices of the merchandise.
Thus, the supreme court found that although the Act requires an invoice
to accompany the delivery, the definition of an invoice allows the seller
.

402. Pucci Distrib. Co., 110 N.M. at 375, 796 P.2d at 596.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597. A purchase order is a "document authorizing a seller to deliver
It constitutes an offer which is accepted when the
goods with payment to be made later ....
vendor supplies the quantity and quality ordered." BLACK's LAw DicTIONARY 1235 (6th ed. 1990).
407. Pucci Distrib. Co., 110 N.M. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597.
408. Id. at 375, 796 P.2d at 596.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 376, 769 P.2d at 597. The court was also required to determine whether Pucci had
actually delivered the beer to Nellos. The court applied the substantial evidence standard of review
and affirmed the district court finding that the beer was delivered to Nellos. Id. at 377, 796 P.2d
at 598. The supreme court was also presented with the issue of whether the amount of the trial
court's award of attorney's fees was proper. The supreme court upheld the trial court's award of
attorney's fees, allowing contingent fees to be a consideration in establishing the amount of an
award of attorney's fees. Id. (citing Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979)).
412. Id. at 378, 796 P.2d at 599. The court did not address the issue of whether the Act barred
Pucci from recovery, because Pucci complied with the Act's invoice requirement. Id. at 376, 796
P.2d at 599.
413. Id. The supreme court defined an invoice as:
A written account, or itemized statement of merchandise shipped or sent to a
purchaser * * *, with the quantity, value or prices and charges annexed ....
Document showing details of a sale or purchase transaction. A list sent to a
purchaser * * * containing the items, together with the prices and charges of
merchandise sent or to be sent to him.
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 742 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added by the court)).
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to create the invoice prior to the actual merchandise delivery. 414 The court
then examined whether Nellos's alleged purchase order met the content
requirements for the definition of an invoice.
The disputed document was a Pucci form "which listed various types
of beer including the 2,000 cases of Stroh's and 400 cases of Stroh's
light. ' 41 s The form also contained the "quantity, unit price, total price,
and a discount. "416 In addition, the Pucci form was labeled as an
"invoice. '1 41 7 The court found that Pucci's invoice sufficiently detailed
the transaction of the beer merchandise to be delivered to Nellos. 418 Thus,
the document complied with the definition of an invoice, and there was
substantial evidence for the trial court to determine that the disputed
419
document was, in fact, a valid invoice.
Nevertheless, the court still had to consider whether the previously
created invoice actually accompanied the delivery as required by the
Liquor Control Act. 420 Nellos contends that evidence indicates the invoice
did not accompany the beer delivery. 42' The supreme court, however,
found sufficient evidence to negate Nellos's argument. 422 First, Pucci's
driver testified that he signed a copy of the invoice and delivered it to
Nellos's retail liquor establishment with the beer. 423 Pucci's accounts
receivable supervisor testified that a copy of the invoice was taken by
the driver when he made the delivery. 424 Pucci's sales supervisor also
testified in detail concerning the circumstances of the delivery and that
the driver left a copy of the invoice with the delivery. 42 Finally, Pucci
presented photographs of the Stroh's beer delivered by Pucci located on
Nellos's display floor. 426 The supreme court found substantial evidence
showing that Pucci delivered the invoice and the Stroh's beer and affirmed
the district court's award and remanded the case to the district court to
determine an appropriate award of attorney's fees and costs for Pucci. 427

414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 377, 796 P.2d at 598.
419. Id. The court held that there was "adequate evidence" for the district court to conclude
the disputed invoice was a valid invoice.
420. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-3 (Repi. Pamp. 1992).
421. Pucci Distrib. Co., 110 N.M. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597.
422. Id. at 377-78, 796 P.2d at 598-99. The supreme court stated that "the issue on appeal is
not whether there is sufficient evidence to support an alternative finding, but whether the court's
determinations were supported." Id. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597 (citing Nosker v. Trinity Land Co.,
107 N.M. 333, 757 P.2d 803 (Ct. App.), cert denied, 107 N.M. 267, 755 P.2d 605 (1988)). The
supreme court defined substantial evidence as "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citing Register v. Roberson Constr. Co., 106 N.M. 243,
741 P.2d 1364 (1987)).
423. Id. at 375, 796 P.2d at 596.
424. Id. at 377, 796 P.2d at 598.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 378, 796 P.2d at 599.
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This case differentiates, albeit quite subtly, between a purchase order
and an invoice. 28 A "purchase order" is a written offer which a vendor
gives to a supplier. 42 ' The vendor uses this offer to request and authorize
a supplier to furnish certain goods.4" The supplier then creates an invoice
when it manifests its intention to accept the vendor's offer. An "invoice,"
on the other hand, is a written account or itemized statement containing
the items ordered and the quantity, prices, and charges of the items sent
or to be sent to the vendor.' 31 Thus, as the court held, the seller can
create the invoice at a date earlier from the actual date of the delivery
that a purchase
of the merchandise. 4 2 Additionally, the court established
43 3
order and invoice can exist on the same form. Hence, when Nellos
placed its order on the purchase order form and signed it, Pucci simultaneously manifested its intent to accept the offer because the form's
contents satisfied all the requirements of an invoice. Finally, Pucci met
it supplied
New Mexico's first element of accepting a liquor order when
434
goods.
of
quality
and
quantity
Nellos with its requested
The second "acceptance" requirement for New Mexico suppliers of
liquor, such as Pucci, is that the wholesaler must provide the invoice to
the vendor at the time of the delivery.3 In addition to containing the
prices and charges for the liquor merchandise, the invoice must contain
the date of the sale and the quantity of each item delivered to the
vendor.4 Pucci met the above invoice requirements, and its testimonial
evidence on the delivery issue provided the courts with substantial evidence
37
to infer that Pucci delivered the beer and a valid invoice to Nellos.
D. The Unfair Trade Practices Act
The purpose of the Unfair Practices Act'38 is to prevent false or
misleading statements, or descriptions associated with the sale of goods
428. Id. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597. The supreme court shows that Pucci accepted Nellos's offer
or solicitation for buying Stroh's beer by issuing Nellos an invoice describing the beer including its
price:
[Nellos] claims ... that the document was a ... purchase order, not an invoice.
The document at issue, which is labeled as an invoice. [contains] a list of various
types of beer.... . Listed on the form are quantity, unit price, total price, and a
discount. We hold that ... this was an invoice.
Id.
429.

BLcK's LAW DiCTIONARY

1235 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "purchase order").

430. Id.
431. Id. at 827 (defining "invoice").
432. Pucci Distrib. Co., 110 N.M. at 376-77, 796 P.2d at 597-98. "The invoice was dated October
12 and delivery was made October 15." Id. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597.
433. Nelios placed "a purchase order on Pucci's invoice form (termed a prebill) with delivery to
occur sometime hereafter." Id. at 375, 796 P.2d at 596. The supreme court held that the "document
[purchase order] at issue" was an invoice. Id. at 376, 796 P.2d at 597.
434. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (6th ed. 1990) (seller accepts the purchase order offer when
seller "[delivers] the quantity and quality ordered.").
435. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-8A-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1992).
436. Id.
437. Pucci Distrib. Co., 110 N.M. at 376-77, 796 P.2d at 597-98.
438. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-1 to -21 (Rep!. Pamp. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1991).
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and services in the normal course of trade or commerce which tends to
deceive purchasers. 43 9 The Act provides protection for buyers in the
ordinary course of business in that it deters a seller from inducing the
buyer to "deal" with the seller through false or deceptive trade practices. 4 4
One must establish four elements to invoke the Unfair Trade Practices
Act."' First, the complainant "must show that the party charged made
'an oral or written statement, visual description or other representation'
that was either false or misleading."" 2 Second, "the false or misleading
representation must have been 'knowingly made in connection with the
sale, lease, rental or loan of goods or services in the extension of credit
or . . . collection of debts."'" 3 Third, "the conduct complained of must
have occurred in the regular course of the representer's trade or commerce." 4 " "[Fourth, the representation must have been of the type that
'may, tends to or does, deceive or mislead any person."'4 41
During the survey period, the New Mexico Supreme Court addressed
the issues of misrepresentation of goods as new, awarding of damages,
trebling or multiplying damages, and awarding attorney's fees and costs
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
1. Alteration of Goods
In Hale v. Basin Motor Co.,4" the plaintiffs-appellees, Gregory and
Donna Hale ("Hales"), purchased a 1985 Buick Riviera from Basin
Motor Company ("Basin")." 7 Basin sold the car as a "new demonstrator. ' " After the purchase, the paint finish on the right front fender,
right door, and right door pillar began "oxidizing, fading, and distorting.""49 The Hales discovered that the car had been in an accident
and subsequently repaired prior to sale. 40" Based on estimates obtained
by the Hales, it was determined that the car was worth $10,175 undamaged . 4 The actual value of the car, however, was estimated at $9,175
as a result of the accident and the need for a paint job. 4 2 The Hales
repainted the car at a cost of $840 and eventually traded it in. 453 At
trade-in, the dealer valued the car at $9,000 and added a $949 over-

439.
440.
441.
(1988).
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. § 57-12-2(C).
Id.
See Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell,
Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN.
Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN.
Id.
Id. (quoting N.M. STAT. ANN.
110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006
Id. at 316, 795 P.2d at 1008.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

N.A.,

107 N.M. 100, 101, 753 P.2d 346, 347

§ 57-12-2(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
§ 57-12-2(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
§ 57-12-2(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
(1990).
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allowance to make the deal and pay off the balance the Hales still owed
on the car. 54
The Hales brought suit against Basin, alleging that Basin had violated
the Unfair Trade Practices Act by making misrepresentations about the
car's condition. 4 " The Hales claimed that Basin failed to provide them
with an affidavit describing the damage to the car in violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act.4 5 6 Further, the Hales contended that Basin's
5 Specifacts were fraudulent because it intended to deceive the Hales.
ically, the Hales argue that Basin received a price greater than the car's
the fact that the car was previously
actual market value by concealing
45
damaged in an accident.
The trial court held that Basin willfully violated the Unfair Trade
45 9
Practices Act by failing to disclose the car's damages to the Hales.
The trial court also held that Basin knowingly represented the car60 "as
good as new" after it altered (repaired and refinished) the car,4 in
violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act."46
The trial court computed damages by subtracting the total amount the
Hales received for the car at the time of trade-in ($9,749.50) from the
estimated value of the car undamaged ($10,175).46 Thus, the base award
was $425.50.46 The court then trebled the damages and awarded the
Hales $1,262.50.4" The court refused the Hales' request for punitive
damages holding that the trebling of damages was punitive 5in nature
and, hence, precluded an additional punitive damage award.' - Finally,
the court awarded the Hales attorney's fees of $7,741.93 and costs of7
$954.27.4 6 Basin appealed this decision and the Hales cross-appealed.46

454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. The Unfair Trade Practices Act requires that the seller of a motor vehicle to provide
the buyer with an affidavit, at the time of sale, which "states to the best of the seller's knowledge
whether there has been an alteration or chassis repair due to wreck damage." N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-12-6(B)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
457. Hale, 110 N.M. at 316-17, 795 P.2d at 1008-09.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
460. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
461. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
462. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
463. Id.
464. Id.
Where the trier of fact finds that the party charged with an unfair or deceptive
trade practice or an unconscionable trade practice has willfully engaged in the trade
practice, the court may award up to three times actual damages or three hundred
dollars ($300), whichever is greater, to the party complaining of the practice.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-10(C) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
465. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009. Because the trebled award was punitive in nature.
the trial court refused to consider Hales' claim of common law fraud because that damage award
is also punitive. Hence, the trial court felt precluded from considering common law fraud as the
punitive damages would duplicate the trebled damage award already granted under the Unfair Trade
Practices Act. Id. at 320 n.3, 795 P.2d at 1012 n.3.
466. Id. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
467. Id.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the following issues: (1)
Is a seller who represents that a motor vehicle is a "new demonstrator"
representing that the vehicle is "new" under the Unfair Trade Practices
Act? 4" (2) Under what circumstances is the seller of a motor vehicle
required to provide the purchaser with an affidavit describing any alterations or repair work to the vehicle?" 9 (3) Does the Unfair Trade
Practices Act require a showing of multiple violations before the seller
violates the Act? 470 (4) How are damages calculated, and when are treble
damages warranted under the Unfair Trade Practices Act? 47' (5) Is the
court precluded from considering punitive damages under alternative
theories if trebled damages are awarded under the Unfair Trade Practices
Act? 472 (6) Does the Unfair Trade Practices Act permit an appellate court
to award costs and attorney's fees incurred on appeal? 473
a. Representing a Vehicle as a "New Demonstrator"
The supreme court first examined the statutory definition for misrepresenting a good as "new. ' 474 The Act states that an unfair trade practice
is any false or misleading statement knowingly made in connection with
a sale, by any person in the regular course of his trade, which may tend
to or does deceive or mislead any person. 47 An example of an unfair
trade practice is when a person, in the regular course of his trade,
represents the goods as original or new when they are actually deteriorated,
altered, reconditioned, or used. 476 A motor vehicle is clearly a good within
477
the meaning of the Act.
The supreme court stated that although Basin represented the car as
a "new demonstrator" the car had several thousand miles on it before
478
the Hales purchased it.
Additionally, the Hales requested that Basin
perform several minor repairs on the car before delivery. 4 9 Thus, the
supreme court found that in light of these facts, there was no substantial
evidence tending to show that the Hales believed the car was "new" as
defined by the Act." 0 Evidently, the court found that the Hales' knowledge
of the car's mileage coupled with their requests for many repairs proved
that the Hales knew or should have known they were purchasing a
"used" car. Furthermore, the court stated that substantial evidence was

468. Id.
469. Id.
470. Id. at 318, 795 P.2d at 1010.
471. Id. at 318-19, 795 P.2d at 1010-11.
472. Id. at 320, 795 P.2d at 1012.
473. Id. at 321, 795 P.2d at 1013.
474. Id. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
475. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
476. Id. § 57-12-2(D)(6).
477. Id. § 57-12-6 ("Misrepresentation of motor vehicles; penalty").
478. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
479. Id.
480. Id.
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lacking to find that Basin represented the car as ''new' as that term is
used in Section 57-2(D)(6)."'8
It appears that the court interprets "new" as synonymous with "original. ' 48 2 The supreme court implicitly found that "demonstrator," a term
commonly used in the automobile sale business, modified "new" so that
"new demonstrator" described a used car in excellent condition as opposed
4 3 Hence, the buyer could
to a brand new car direct from the factory.
not reasonably infer that the car was in its original out-of-the-factory
condition when Basin described the car as a "new demonstrator." The
court, however, went on to state that Basin's use of "new demonstrator"
may have been misleading when coupled with the undisclosed collision
damage and repairs .4 4 Nevertheless, the court was still unable to conclude
the Act"' because Basin did not intend to suggest
that Basin violated
486
new.
was
the car
The court found that substantial evidence did not exist in support of
the Hales' allegations that Basin intended to deceive or mislead the Hales
into believing that the car was new." 7 The "unfair trade practice" definition specifically states the violator's culpability as: ". . . any false or
misleading statement ... knowingly made ... by any person in the
regular course of his trade or commerce, which may, tends to or does
"I' The court found that the Act
deceive or mislead any person . ...
mislead or tend to mislead a
may
statements
the
only requires that
that Basin actually intend
require
not
does
however,
Act,
buyer .49 The
aware that its statements
is
or
knows
Basin
that
only
but
mislead,
to
may tend to mislead or deceive. 49° Thus, while Basin may not have
willfully made statements with intentions to mislead the Hales, it is possible
that Basin may have been aware that its statements might mislead the
Hales.

481. Id.
482. The drafter's language states that an unfair trade practice includes "representing that goods
are original or new if they are ... altered ... used or secondhand .... N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-12-2(D)(6) (emphasis added).
483. "Basin Motor represented that the vehicle had been used as a demonstrator. A statement
by Basin Motor that the vehicle was a 'new demonstrator' may well have been misleading ...
however, we cannot conclude Basin Motor's representation was intended to suggest that the vehicle
was unused or 'new.' This is the import of the specific Section 57-12-2(D)(6)." Hale, 110 N.M. at
317, 795 P.2d at 1009 (emphasis added).
484. Id.
485. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(6) (Supp. 1991) (states an unfair trade practice occurs when
a person in the regular course of his trade represents goods as original or new if they are deteriorated,
altered, reconditioned, used, or secondhand).
486. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
487. Id.
488. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
489. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009 (1990) (emphasis added) (stating that representing
the vehicle as a 'new demonstrator' may have been misleading in light of the undisclosed collision
damage and repairs").
490. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(6) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Ashlock v. Sunwest
Bank of Roswell, N.A., 107 N.M. 100, 101, 753 P.2d 346, 347 (1988). "Had the legislature wished
intent to deceive to be an essential element of the offense, it would have so specified." Id.
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According to the Act, this awareness is enough to hold Basin in violation
of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 491 First, Basin withheld the fact that
the car was in an accident and that Basin performed body repairs on
the car.492 This fact along with Basin's representation that the car was
a "new demonstrator" is evidence that Basin represented that the car is
in as new a condition as the consumer can reasonably expect from a
demonstrator vehicle. It should be obvious to the consumer that a demonstrator vehicle already has been driven several thousand miles. On the
other hand, a consumer who purchases a new demonstrator vehicle,
cannot reasonably expect that the new demonstrator has sustained damage
in an accident that substantially affects the vehicle's value. 49 One might
reasonably infer, from the evidence, that Basin feared the Hales may
not purchase the vehicle if they were aware that the car was previously
damaged. 494 Thus, it is plausible that Basin knew that by representing
the car as a new demonstrator, it probably had a better chance of closing
the deal. 495 The supreme court found that Basin did not use the word
"new" to suggest the car is unused or original, which "is the import
of section 57-12-2(D)(6)." 49 Basin's representation, however, tends to
mislead a consumer that the car is of a particular quality (a new demonstrator), when the car is actually of another quality (a previously
damaged and poorly repaired demonstrator). 497 This is a violation of the
498
Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Furthermore, in Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell, N.A. ,499 the
supreme court held that the Act applies to all misleading or deceptive
statements, regardless of the violator's intent, or lack of intent, to make
the statements.1s° The seller's actual intent is of no import in determining
whether the seller violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 50 ' Therefore,
to find a violation of the Act, the trial court must find that the seller

491. Richardson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Johnson, 100 N.M. 779, 782, 676 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Ct. App.
1984). "[A]n intent to deceive is not a requirement under the New Mexico statute. Our statute
does, however, require that a representation be 'knowingly made'. In this case the failure to disclose
must have been a knowing nondisclosure. A knowing nondisclosure requires an awareness of the
nondisclosure." Id. at 782-83, 676 P.2d at 1347-48.
492. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009 (1990) ("statement... misleading in light of the
undisclosed collision damage and repairs").
493. Id. at 318, 795 P.2d at 1010 (1990) ("goods are 'altered' if, as measured against the reasonable
expectations of the consumer, the characteristics or value of the motor vehicle is affected in a
meaningful way"); cf. Boulevard Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Richardson, 374 So. 2d 857, 859 (Ala.

1979).
494. Basin represented the car as a new demonstrator and did not disclose the collision damage
nor the subsequent repairs to the car. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
495. See supra notes 490-91.
496. Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009 (1990).
497. See supra note 490.
498. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(5) (Supp. 1991) (stating an "unfair or deceptive trade practice"
occurs when any person in the regular course of his trade represents that goods are of a particular
quality if they are of another quality); see supra note 492 and accompanying text.
499. 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
500. Id. at 102, 753 P.2d at 348.
501. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(D)(6) (Supp. 1991).
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knew that its statements were misleading or would tend to mislead or
deceive the purchaser. 5
b. Affidavit Describing Alterations or Repairs
The Act requires a seller of a motor vehicle to furnish an affidavit
at the time of the sale that "states to the best of the seller's knowledge
whether there has been an alteration or chassis repair due to wreck
damage."10 3 The supreme court held that Basin was in violation of the
4
Act because it failed to provide the Hales with an affidavit .50 The court
applied basic English grammar rules and held that the statutory language
"due to wreck damage" only applies to "chassis repair" and not to an
"alteration. " 50 With this interpretation, the court impliedly ruled that
Basin was not limited, under the Act, to only disclosing alterations to
the car as a result of the accident.506 If Basin were only required to
disclose alterations as a result of an accident, the circumstances under
which the Act would require an alteration disclosure would be severely
limited. 5°0 The court held that goods are altered if the characteristics or
value of the goods are affected in a meaningful ways5N The repairs affect
the value "in a meaningful way" if they affect the value of the vehicle
in the eyes of the consumer. 5 9 Substituting one standardized part for
is not considered to affect the value of a vehicle in a meaningful
another
5 0
way. 1
Basin's repairs, however, were extensive. Basin replaced the right front
fender, straightened the right door frame, drilled holes in the door panel
to pull out a dent, ground down the sheet metal in the damaged area
and resurfaced it with body filler, and repainted the damaged area."
The damage and repairs clearly affected the value of the car in the eyes
of the consumer. The court held: "This was sufficient evidence to support
the trial court's finding that the vehicle was altered within the meaning
51 2
of [the Act], and the repair should have been disclosed by affidavit.
c. Multiple Violations Not Required
Under the Unfair Trade Practices Act
Basin argued that the Unfair Trade Practices Act requires that a seller
commit multiple violations to fall within the purview of the Act and
that the trial court erred by finding a violation of the Act where it had

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Hale, 110 N.M. at 317, 795 P.2d at 1009.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-6(B)(2) (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
Hale, 110 N.M. at 318, 795 P.2d at 1010.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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only a single occurrence of violating the Act.' 3 The court disagreed and
relied on its earlier holding in Ashlock v. Sunwest Bank of Roswell,
N.A. 51 4 to show that multiple violations are not required for a court to
apply the Act. 5 In Ashlock, the court found that the. Act does not
distinguish between single and multiple occurrences of prohibited conduct.11 6 Hence, the Ashlock court found that a single instance of prohibited
conduct triggers the application of the Act.51 7 Thus, the court reaffirmed
its earlier holding by specifically finding that multiple violations were
8
not required under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.5
d. Calculating and Trebling Damages
The court found that a person who suffers any loss of money as a
result of a practice declared unlawful by the Act is entitled to recover
actual damages or $100 whichever is greater. 5'9 The damaged party can
only recover the repair costs or the difference in the value of the car
before and after the damage, whichever is the smaller amount. 5 °
The trial court compared the cost of repairs to the difference between
the property's fair market value before sustaining the damage and the
amount or value the dealer gave to the Hales for trading-in the car. 52'
The amount the dealer gave the Hales for trade-in does not reflect the
car's actual fair market value after damage, as required, but reflects the
car's value after repairs.5 2 Furthermore, the dealer may have taken into
consideration other factors besides the car repairs, when he allowed an
over-allowance to close the deal. 23 Thus, the supreme court found that
the trial court applied an incorrect measure of damages.
The supreme court relied upon expert testimony to estimate the car's
value after it sustained the damage.5 2 ' The expert determined the car's
value, before the damages, was $10,175 and its value after the damage
was $9,175, a difference of $1000.525 The Hales paid $840 in repair
costs.5 26 Therefore, because the repair cost was less then the difference
in the car's value before and after the damage, the Hales could only

513. Id.
514. 107 N.M. 100, 753 P.2d 346 (1988).
515. Hale, 110 N.M. at 318, 795 P.2d at 1010.
516. Ashlock, 107 N.M. at 102, 753 P.2d at 348.
517. Hale, 110 N.M. at 318, 795 P.2d at 1010.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 318-19, 795 P.2d at 1010-11 (construing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(B) (Supp. 1991)).
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id. (the trial court calculated the difference in the car's value at $425.50 by subtracting the
amount received for trade-in, $9,749.50, from the car's value prior to any damage, $10,175. Because
the difference in car value was smaller than the $840 repair cost, the lower court awarded Hale

$425.50).
523. Id.

524. Id.
525. Id. at 316, 795 P.2d at 1007.
526. Id.
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recover $840. 21 Nevertheless, this amount is almost twice the amount
awarded by the trial court.
Basin next argued that the trial court was unable to apply retroactively
the treble damage portion of the Unfair Trade Practices Act in this
case. 528 In upholding the trial court's award of treble damages, the majority
found that the amendment to the Act was remedial in nature and could
be retroactively applied in this case. 29 The court defined a remedial right
as a right that provides an additional remedy to enforce substantive rights
that already exist.530 By comparison, the court defined substantive right
as a right that creates a new duty, right, or obligation under the law. 53'
Although Justice Montgomery concurred in the result, he disagreed
with the majority's classification of the treble damages award portion
of the Act as a remedial right.532 Justice Montgomery argued that the
difference between a substantive and a remedial right must be more than
just that substantive rights are new rights or obligations and remedial
rights are merely an expansion or contraction of existing rights. 33 According to Justice Montgomery, the court should look to the amendment's
purpose when determining whether retroactive application is appropriate?'
One purpose of this amendment is to provide an incentive for seeking
redress of these often relatively minor damage awards. 3 ' In this case,
applying the amendment will not advocate this purpose as the damaged
party did not have this amendment's special incentive to seek redress
because the amendment did not exist at that time. 36 Another purpose
is to deter unfair or deceptive trade practices. 37 Although the legislature
enacted the amendment after the "unfair" car sale, applying the amendment retroactively will deter other car dealers, and others in general,
from unfair trade practices, especially because the suit was brought after
the effective date of the amendment 38 By considering these purposes,
the court may determine whether it should apply an amendment retroactively.
e. Choice of Remedies
The Hales claimed that they were entitled to punitive damages under
the common law fraud theory in addition to the trebled damages under

527. Id. at 319, 795 P.2d at 1010.
528. Id.(amendment added to statute on June 19, 1987, which is after Basin sold Hale the car).
529. Id.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 322, 795 P.2d at 1013 (Montgomery, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the Unfair Trade Practices Act." 39 On its face this argument appears
persuasive, but the supreme court found that allowing additional damages
would result in a duplication in awards because the trebling was punitive
in nature. 514 Nevertheless, the court held that the Hales had the option
of recovering trebled damages under the Unfair Trade Practices Act or
punitive damages under a common law fraud theory.5 4' As a result, the
trial court erred when it refused to accept the findings of either party
on the fraud issue. 42 Evidently the trial court precluded itself from
considering a punitive award because the trebled award was already
punitive in nature and, therefore, no additional punitive damages were
awarded.5 43 The supreme court remanded the case back to the trial court
with instructions to consider the common law fraud claim and, should
it find fraud, give the Hales the option of recovering either the trebled
or punitive damages.5Y Therefore, a finding of a violation under the
Unfair Trade Practices Act does not prohibit the trial court from finding
in favor of the plaintiff on other theories raised by the plaintiff; rather,
the Act allows a plaintiff to choose its remedy.
f. Costs and Attorney's Fees On Appeal
The New Mexico Supreme Court faced an issue of first impression on
the issue of costs and attorney's fees: Whether the Hales are entitled to
costs and attorney's fees on appeal as well as on the action in the trial
court. 45 The Act states that the court shall award attorney's fees and
costs to the party complaining of a violation under the Unfair Trade
Practices Act if the complaining party prevails.146 The court had to
determine whether a prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees and
costs incurred at the appellate court level as well as at the trial court
level.
In Superior Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. David Montoya Construction,
Inc. 47 the supreme court awarded the prevailing party, in an open account
case, attorney's fees and costs at the trial level and the appellate level.""
The court's rationale was that the underlying statute's' 9 purpose is to
539. Id. at 320, 795 P.2d at 1011 (Hale argued that N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(D) requires
the court to also award punitive damages under common law fraud because the section states, "the
relief provided in this section is in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same conduct
under the common law or other statutes of this state").
540. Id. (referring to the Roberts v. American Warranty Corp., 514 A.2d 1132 (Del. 1986),

decision that held punitive damages are not allowed when actual damages have been multiplied
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act).
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. Id. at 320 n.3, 795 P.2d at 1011 n.3.
544. Id. at 322, 795 P.2d at 1013.
545. Id. at 321, 795 P.2d at 1012.
546. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(C) (Supp. 1991).
547. 108 N.M. 401, 733 P.2d 246 (1989).
548. Id.
549. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-2-2.1 (Supp. 1989) (states, in part, that the district court, small
claims court or magistrate court may award reasonable attorneys fees, to the prevailing party, in
any civil action on an open account case).
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discourage the threat of litigation as a tactic to enforce false claims or
to avoid paying debts. 5 0 In addition, the statute motivates the party,
who is convinced it is correct, to pursue litigation knowing that it may
recover attorney's fees."'
The supreme court awarded the Hales attorney's fees and costs based
on a similar rationale. First, the Act does not limit an award of attorney's
fees and costs to only trial expenses. 5 2 Second, the court found that
awarding attorney's fees and costs at the trial level and at the appellate
level is consistent with the private remedy section in the Unfair Trade
Practices Act:" Awarding expenses at both the trial and appellate level
enhances the private remedy's purpose of motivating parties to successfully
"press their claims" especially in light of the sometimes minor damage
claim.554 This aids the prevailing party to win in practice, rather than
merely to win on principal. 5 Therefore, the Unfair Trade Practices Act
permits the prevailing party to recover its costs and attorney's fees related
to both trying the case and meeting or asserting rights on appeal.
E. Administrative Law - The Motor Carrier Act
1. Proof of Public Need Required for "Right to Transport

Certification of Common Carrier"
The New Mexico State Corporation Commission ("Commission") is
charged with administering the New Mexico Motor Carrier Act."' The
Motor Carrier Act regulates motor carriers that seek to operate within
the state 5 7 To engage in transportation as a common carrier, a party
must apply to the Commission, which has the power to issue a Certificate
of Public Convenience and Necessity. 55 The Commission can then au-

550. Superior Concrete Pumping, Inc., 108 N.M. at 405, 733 P.2d at 350.
551. Id.
552. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-10(C) (Supp. 1991).
553. Hale, 110 N.M. at 321, 795 P.2d at 1012.
554. Id. at 322, 795 P.2d at 1013.
555. As N.M. STAT. ANN. section 57-12-10(B) contemplates, most damages under the Unfair Trade
Practice Act are between $100 and $300. A party may win in theory, but may lose for all practical
purposes because the prevailing party's attorney's fees and costs will probably easily exceed $300.
Thus, the court's discretion in awarding attorney's fees and costs both at the trial and appellate
levels enables the prevailing party to win in the practical monetary sense.
556. N.M. CoNsT. art. XI, § 7. This section provides that the Commission has constitutional
authority to determine matters of public convenience and necessity relating to common carriers.
Additionally, N.M. STAT. ANN. section 65-2-81 states:
It is declared to be the policy of New Mexico that the transportation of persons
and property by motor vehicle for hire (upon] public highways of this state be
supervised and regulated so as to provide for the developments, coordination and
preservation of a safe, sound, adequate, economical and efficient intrastate motor
To that end, it is necessary that the regulation promote comcarrier system ....
petitive, economical and efficient service by motor carrier, and reasonable charges
therefor, without undue preference or advantage; enable efficient and well-managed
and provide for competitive motor
motor carriers to earn adequate profits, ...
carrier services at affordable rates . . ..
557. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-83.
558. Id. § 65-2-84(D).
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thorize an applicant to provide transportation as a common carrier under
the Motor Carrier Act."19 Such certification requires:
(1) that the person is fit, willing and able to provide the transportation to be authorized by the certificate and to comply with the
Motor Carrier Act and regulations of the commission; and
(2) on the basis of evidence presented by persons supporting the
issuance of the certificate, that the service proposed will serve a useful
public purpose, responsive to a public demand or need.51"
The Commission must deny the certification if, based on intervenor/
protestant testimony, certification would be inconsistent with public con56
venience and necessity. '
In Oil Transportation Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 62 the
supreme court examined, after a lengthy administrative process, whether
a plaintiff complied with the Commission's regulations regarding Public
Convenience and Necessity certification. 63 Ash Corporation ("Ash Corp.")
applied for a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the
64
Commission to transport petroleum products throughout New Mexico.
Oil Transportation Company ("Oil Co."), consolidated its application
with Mission Petroleum Carriers for the same type of certificate. 6 At
one point, both Ash Corp. and Oil Co. intervened to protest each other's
application.5 6 Oil Co. moved to consolidate the Ash Corp. and the Oil
Co. applications, but the motion was denied due to the Commission's
failure to act upon the motion. 67 Finally, the Commission granted Ash
Corp.'s application, and a few days later, denied Oil Co.'s application."6
Oil Co. appealed the Commission's denial of its application to district
court claiming that the Commission's decisions were arbitrary, biased,
and unsupported by substantial evidence. 56 9 Oil Co. further argued that
the Commission's refusal to consolidate the Ash Corp. and Oil Co.
applications constituted a violation of due process and equal protection.57 0
The Commission responded that their decision was proper and claimed
that Oil Co. lacked standing to appeal Ash Corp.'s certification because

559. N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
560. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84(D)(1), (2).
561. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84(E); see also Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp.
Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 473-74, 684 P.2d 1135, 1138-39 (1984).
562. 110 N.M. 568, 798 P.2d 169 (1990).
563. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84. Although the term "public convenience'and necessity" is
not expressly defined, this section of the statute sets forth the general requirements for Public
Convenience and Necessity certification.
564. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 569, 798 P.2d at 170.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. section 65-2-120(A) (1978) states in pertinent part: "Any motor carrier
and any other person in interest being dissatisfied with any order or determination of the
[Clommission... may commence an action in the district court for Santa Fe county against the
[Clommission .... "
570. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 569, 798 P.2d at 170.
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Oil Co. was an intervenor in the earlier action. 71 The district court
vacated the Commission's earlier decision, and ordered the Commission
to provide a comparative review of both the Ash Corp. and Oil Co.
applications." 72 The district court further found that the Ash Corp. certification was supported by substantial evidence, and instructed the Commission, if after comparative review for Ash Corp., to correct a clerical
error in Ash Corp.'s certificate .1 7 Oil Co. moved to reconsider the court's
findings that substantial evidence supported Ash Corp.'s certification
because it conflicted with the court's decision to vacate and remand the
Commission's order."74 The district court denied this motion, reasoning
that the two applications were not mutually exclusive "as an economic
575
fact."
The Commission, during remand, maintained its original orders on the
grounds that Ash Corp.'s services were publicly needed and Oil Co.'s
were not. 576 Additionally, the Commission found that Oil Co.'s intervenors
established that certification of Oil Co.'s application would contravene
public convenience and necessity.5 77 Notwithstanding the district court's
orders, the Commission failed to make a comparative review between
the Ash Corp. application and the Oil Co. application.5 7 Because a
comparative review never commenced, Oil Co. again motioned the district
court for relief, arguing lack of due process under the first district court
order.5 79 The district court denied the motion, holding that the Commission
complied with the original remand instructions and that the Commission's
findings were supported by substantial evidence.580 Oil Co. appealed the
district court decision directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court.5"' On
appeal, the supreme court examined "whether the Commission's orders
were 1) within the scope of its authority; 58 2 2) supported by substantial
evidence; 3) arbitrary, capricious,
or fraudulent; and 4) the result of bias
58 3
or an abuse of discretion.
571. Id.
572. Id. When applications are contemporaneous and seek substantially the same authority, due
process requires that the applications be consolidated for comparative decision making. See Ashbacker
Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
573. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 570, 798 P.2d at 171.
574. Id.
575. Id. (emphasis omitted).
576. Id.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-120(G) (Repl. Pamp. 1990). This section states that any party may
appeal to the supreme court within 60 days of service of notice.
582. The New Mexico State Corp. Commission is constitutionally empowered to determine matters
of public convenience and necessity relating to common carriers. N.M. CONST. art. XI, § 6. The
Commission also is authorized to set licensure requirements to perform its functions. N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 65-2-83(C), (D). As discussed, the Commission has constitutional authority to regulate
common carriers. This issue was not brought up on appeal.
583. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 570, 798 P.2d at 171. This standard for appellate review is
set forth in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-120 (Repl. Pamp. 1990). See N.M. R. App. P. 12-8-22(A);
see also Groendyke Transport v. State Corp. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 477, 684 P.2d 1135, 1142
(1984).
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"Substantial evidence supporting administrative agency action is relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." ' 584 The Commission denied Oil Co.'s application for its failure
to show a public need or request for its services." 5 The court disagreed
with this analysis, and found that public need is not shown by presenting
evidence that the public require the carrier's service.58 6 The court held
instead that public need is shown "by identifying 1) commodities to be
shipped; 2) points to and from which traffic moves; 3) the volume of
freight to be tendered to the applicant; and 4) why present freight
transportation services fail to meet present demands. 5 7 The court found
that because Ash Corp.'s witnesses declared the public need for more
carriers, and that this evidence should also have been used in Oil Co.'s
application. 88 The court concluded that the failure to use this relevant
evidence substantially
deprived Oil Co. of evidence supporting its ap589
plication.
"An administrative agency acts arbitrarily or capriciously when its
action is unreasonable, irrational, wilful (sic), and does not result from
a sifting process.' '59 Because the Commission established public need
through Ash Corp.'s witnesses, the court held that the Commission had
no rational basis for denying the Oil Co. application.5 91 The court concluded that the Commission's decision was arbitrary, because they found
public need from Ash Corp.'s evidence, but failed
to find Oil Co.'s
5 92
requirement of public convenience and necessity.
"An agency abuses its discretion when its decision is not in accord
with legal procedure or supported by its findings, or when the evidence
does not support its findings. '" 9 3 Because the Commission ignored the
first district court order to comparatively review both Ash Corp.'s and

584. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 571, 798 P.2d at 172; see National Council on Compensation
Ins. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 282, 756 P.2d 558, 562 (1988).
585. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 571, 798 P.2d at 172.
586. Id.
587. Id.(citations omitted). The court found that the Commission's denial of the Oil Co. application
was based on a strict interpretation of Section 65-2-84(D), which requires "persons supporting the
issuance of the certificate. . ." to present evidence that the public requires their services. See
Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 616 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1980).
588. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 572, 798 P.2d at 173.
589. Id.
590. Id. at 572, 798 P.2d at 173 (citing Perkins v. Department of Human Servs., 106 N.M. 651,
655, 748 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1987); Garcia v. New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't, 94 N.M. 178,
179, 608 P.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1979) (quoting Olson v. Rothwell, 28 Wis. 2d 233, 239, 137
N.W.2d 86, 89 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980))).
591. Id. Both Ash Corp. and Oil Co. presented evidence of commodities to be shipped, points
of transportation, and prospective freight volume. Ash Corp.'s witnesses testified that the state
needed more carriers to meet the public demand and encourage competition. Oil Co.'s evidence
focused on quality of product transportation and business expansion. Oil Co.'s competitors, however,
presented evidence that the New Mexico carrier business was declining, and that Oil Co.'s certification
would harm present carriers. Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 573, 798 P.2d at 174 (citing Perkins v. Department of Human Seres., 106 N.M. 651,
655, 748 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1987)). "An agency also abuses its discretion when its decision is
contrary to logic and reason." Id.
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Oil Co.'s applications, the court found that the Commission abused its
discretion by failing to consolidate the evidence of public need when
considering Oil Co.'s application for certification.519
The court remanded the decision to the Commission to make a comparative review based on the whole record of both the Ash Corp. and
Oil Co. applications. 95 The court further required the Commission to
"enter additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, based upon
the entire consolidated record," to determine whether the grant of a
certificate to Oil Co. would be, "inconsistent with the public convenience
and necessity" and whether Oil Co. is, "fit, willing and able to provide
the transportation to be authorized by the certificate and to comply
with
5
the Motor Carrier Act and regulations of the commission.'"'
This decision clearly defines the State Corporation Commission's legal
responsibilities in certifying common carriers within New Mexico by
enforcing regulations which define statutory conduct by the Commission.
Further, this decision demonstrates that certification hearings which involve more than one applicant allow evidence presented by one applicant
to be used for all other applicants.
VI.

CONCLUSION

New Mexico courts were busy during the survey period, deciding cases
involving commercial law. Many of the decisions had a great impact on
the course of commercial law. Even in those cases in which commercial
law did not change, the court wisely expanded, explained, and established
the relevant areas of law.
JEROME JAY GARCIA
KEVIN LYNN WILDENSTEIN

594. Oil Transp. Co., 110 N.M. at 573, 798 P.2d at 174.
595. Id. at 574, 798 P.2d at 175.
596. Id. at 573, 798 P.2d at 174 (1990); see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 65-2-84(D)(1) (Repl. Pamp.
1990).

